# 1NC – NUSO r4 – Emory NP

## 1NC

### 1NC – Kritik

#### Blackness exists as a metaaporia that interrogates the cyclical ways violence onto blackness is morphed and ultimately appropriated. The 1AC relies on a redemptive narrative of humanity that is fundamentally inaccessible for blacks. Their project is ultimately meant to hide and recreate moments of black death for the sake of redeeming Human life.

Wilderson 20 [Frank B. Wilderson, professor of Drama and African American studies at the University of California, Irvine, “Afropessimism”, page 13-17, JMH]

For most critical theorists writing after 1968, the word aporia is used to designate a contradiction in a text or theoretical undertaking. For example, Jacques Derrida suggests an aporia indicates “a point of undecidability, which locates the site at which the text most obviously undermines its own rhetorical structure, dismantles, or deconstructs itself.” But when I say that Black people embody a meta-aporia for political thought and action, the addition of the prefix meta- goes beyond what Derrida and the poststructuralists meant—it raises the level of abstraction and, in so doing, raises the stakes. In epistemology, a branch of philosophy concerned with the theory of knowledge, the prefix meta- is used to mean about (its own category). Metadata, for example, are data about data (who has produced them, when, what format the data are in, and so on). In linguistics, a grammar is considered as being expressed in a metalanguage, language operating on a higher level of abstraction to describe properties of the plain language (and not itself). Metadiscussion is a discussion about discussion (not any one particular topic of discussion but discussion itself). In computer science, a theoretical software engineer might be engaged in the pursuit of metaprogramming (i.e., writing programs that manipulate programs). **Afropessimism**, then, **is** less of a theory and more of **a metatheory: a critical project that, by deploying Blackness as a lens of interpretation, interrogates the unspoken, assumptive logic of Marxism, postcolonialism, psychoanalysis, and feminism through rigorous theoretical consideration of their properties and assumptive logic, such as their foundations, methods, form, and utility; and it does so, again, on a higher level of abstraction than the discourse and methods of the theories it interrogates.** Again, Afropessimism is, in the main, more of a metatheory than a theory. **It is pessimistic about the claims theories of liberation make when these theories try to explain Black suffering or when they analogize Black suffering with the suffering of other oppressed beings. It does this by unearthing and exposing the meta-aporias, strewn like land mines in what these theories of so-called universal liberation hold to be true.** If, as Afropessimism argues, Blacks are not Human subjects, but are instead structurally inert props, implements for the execution of White and non-Black fantasies and sadomasochistic pleasures, then this also means that, at a higher level of abstraction, the claims of universal humanity that the above theories all subscribe to are ~~hobbled~~ [constricted] by a meta-aporia: a contradiction that manifests whenever one looks seriously at the structure of Black suffering in comparison to the presumed universal structure of all sentient beings. Again, Black people embody a meta-aporia for political thought and action— Black people are the wrench in the works. Blacks do not function as political subjects; instead, our flesh and energies are instrumentalized for postcolonial, immigrant, feminist, LGBTQ, transgender, and workers’ agendas. These so-called **allies are never authorized by Black agendas predicated on Black ethical dilemmas. A Black radical agenda is terrifying to most people on the Left**—think Bernie Sanders—**because it emanates from a condition of suffering for which there is no imaginable strategy for redress—no narrative of social, political, or national redemption**. This crisis, no, this catastrophe, this realization that I am a sentient being who can’t use words like “being” or “person” to describe myself without the scare quotes and the threat of raised eyebrows from anyone within earshot, was crippling. I was convinced that if a story of Palestinian redemption could be told . . . its denouement would culminate in the return of the land, a spatial, cartographic redemption; and if a story of class redemption could be told . . . its denouement would culminate in the restoration of the working day so that one stopped working when surplus values were relegated to the dustbin of history, a temporal redemption; in other words, since postcolonial and working-class redemption were possible, then there must be a story to be told through which one could redeem the time and place of Black subjugation. I was wrong. **I had not dug deep enough to see that though Blacks suffer the time and space subjugation of cartographic deracination and the hydraulics of the capitalist working day, we also suffer as the hosts of Human parasites, though they themselves might be the hosts of parasitic capital and colonialism**. I had looked to theory (first as a creative writer, and only much later as a critical theorist) to help me find/create the story of Black liberation—Black political redemption. What I found instead was that **redemption, as a narrative mode, was a parasite that fed upon me for its coherence. Everything meaningful in my life had been housed under the umbrellas called “critical theory” and “radical politics.”** The parasites had been capital, colonialism, patriarchy, homophobia. And now it was clear that I had missed the boat. My parasites were Humans, all Humans—the haves as well as the have-nots. If critical theory and radical politics are to rid themselves of the parasitism that they heretofore have had in common with radical and progressive movements on the Left, that is, if we are to engage, rather than disavow, **the difference between Humans who suffer through an “economy of disposability” and Blacks who suffer by way of “social death,” then we must come to grips with how the redemption of the subaltern** (a narrative, for example, of Palestinian plenitude, loss, and restoration) **is made possible by the (re)instantiation of a regime of violence that bars Black people from the narrative of redemption**. This requires (a) an understanding of the difference between loss and absence, and (b) an understanding of how the narrative of subaltern loss stands on the rubble of Black absence. Sameer and I didn’t share a universal, postcolonial grammar of suffering. Sameer’s loss is tangible, land. The paradigm of his dispossession elaborates capitalism and the colony. When it is not tangible it is at least coherent, as in the loss of labor power. But how does one describe the loss that makes the world if all that can be said of loss is locked within the world? **How does one narrate the loss of loss? What is the “difference between . . . something to save . . . [and nothing] to lose”?** Sameer forced me to face the depth of my isolation in ways I had wanted to avoid; a deep pit from which neither postcolonial theory, nor Marxism, nor a gender politics of unflinching feminism could rescue me. Why is anti-Black violence not a form of racist hatred but the genome of Human renewal; a therapeutic balm that the Human race needs to know and heal itself? Why must the world reproduce this violence, this social death, so that social life can regenerate Humans and prevent them from suffering the catastrophe of psychic incoherence— absence? Why must the world find its nourishment in Black flesh?

#### Slavery morphs and recodes itself in different ways- it relies on the sadism of liberal progress narratives to perfect itself and maintain “life”. Only the alternative can disrupt this project and render these promises incoherent.

Wilderson 20 [Frank B. Wilderson, professor of Drama and African American studies at the University of California, Irvine, “Afropessimism”, page 94-96, JMH]

Northup’s book implies, without stating directly, why this generalization of sadism—brutality as the constituent element of family bonding—cannot be understood as being triggered by transgressions. It is as ubiquitous as the air he breathes. “It was rarely a day passed without more whippings . . . It is the literal, unvarnished truth, that the crack of the lash and the shrieking of slaves, can be heard from dark till bedtime . . .” Patsey and Solomon, unlike Stella and me, were living in a place and time when civil society and the Human were neither ashamed nor embarrassed by this. A thousand miles upriver and one hundred twenty six years later, Josephine was shocked by this inheritance, but it didn’t take her long to recover, and to claim it. Though the structure of Stella’s “life” (or, better, **the paradigm of social death**, for the quotation marks are essential here) **cannot be reconciled with the** structure of Josephine’s life (or **the paradigm of social life**), there is a connection. But **this connection is parasitic and perverse—regardless of what the socially dead Black person (i.e., Stella and Patsey) or the socially alive Human (i.e., Josephine or Mary Epps) might say about their “relationship.”** It is parasitic because White and non-Black subjectivity cannot be imbued with the capacity for selfknowledge and intersubjective community without anti-Black violence; without, that is, the violence of social death. In other words, **White people and their junior partners need anti-Black violence to know they’re alive.\*** If Hattie McDaniel were to truly die, as Stella proclaimed, it would be tantamount to the death of a parasite’s host. This is what makes social death something more surreal than the end of breath. It is, in the words of David Marriott, a deathliness that saturates life, not an embalming; a resource for Human renewal. **It is perverse for many reasons: one of which is the fact that as civil society matures** (from 1853 to December 1979, when it all went south with Josephine)—and we move historically from the obvious technologies of chattel slavery to universal suffrage, the discourse of human rights, and the concept of universal access to civil society— the anti-Black violence necessary for the elaboration and maintenance of White (and non-Black) subjectivity gets repressed and becomes increasingly unavailable to conscious (as opposed to unconscious) speech. (“I judge people by the quality of their character,” as Dr. King said, “and not the color of their skin”; or the commonly spoken, “At the end of the day, we’re all Americans and we’re in this together”— and other such malarkey of the conscious mind.) But the pageantries of naked and submissive Black flesh, pageantries of bleeding backs and buttocks, whip marks, amputations, and faces closed by horse bits, provide evidence of the role sadism plays in the constitution of White subjectivity, and *12 Years a Slave* makes this visible on the screen, despite its repression in the narrative of both the film and civil society writ large. It is tempting and commonplace to reduce Mary and Edwin Epps’s sadism to individual psychopathology. Or one might think that Edwin Epps is one of a group of exceptionally sadistic people who lived in an exceptionally sadistic time and place. But the film, and to an even greater extent the autobiography, sees (rather than narrates) sadism—the sexual perversion in which gratification is obtained by inflicting physical or mental pain on a love object—not as the individual pathology of a handful of people, but as a generalized condition; generalized in that pleasure, as a constituent element of communal life, cannot be disentangled from anti-Black violence. Conventionally, **the object of sadism can**, tomorrow, **become the subject of sadism**. But the sadism that constitutes the spectacles of *12 Years a Slave*, and which constitutes early nineteenth century society, is not imbued with such reciprocity. The Slaves of social death cannot switch places and make Edwin Epps or his equally cruel wife the love objects of their collective sadism. If they did so in private (if Patsey beat Edwin or Mary in a private bedroom encounter, for example) **it is because such a reversal was occasioned and allowed—in other words, the master used his prerogative and power to play a different game, one in which he suffers because suffering fulfills his fantasy and because, unlike the Slave, his fantasies have “objective value.”** Such role reversals do not imbue the encounter with reciprocity. **The changes that begin to occur after the Civil War and up through the Civil Rights Movement, Black Power, and the American election of a Black president are merely changes in the weather. Despite the fact that the sadism is no longer played out in the open as it was in l840, nothing essential has changed.**

#### Anti-black exploitation is a global phenomenon that transcends borders, gender, and class. The fungibility of the slave secures white domination over black flesh as white slave masters are able to manipulate and violate black people anyway imaginable.

Wilderson 20 [Frank B. Wilderson, professor of Drama and African American studies at the University of California, Irvine, “Afropessimism”, page 302-305, JMH]

The Black people who worked at Mario’s had little in common politically: Master and DeNight kept their politics to themselves, as did most of South Africa’s thirty-five million Black people when they were at work; this was also true of Sibongile and Liyana. Nicolas and Sipho were IFP members, sworn enemies of the ANC, the South African Communist Party, and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). Fana, the dishwasher, was a dedicated comrade. All of these differences mattered in important ways. None of them mattered in ways that were essential. We were all positioned in the same place paradigmatically. We were all, in other words, the antithesis of the Human. We were all implements on Mario and Riana’s plantation. **From the Arab slave trade, which began in ad 625, through its European incarnation beginning in 1452, everyone south of the Sahara had to negotiate captivity. At a global level of abstraction we can see how Africa has been carcerally contained by the rest of the world for more than a thousand years. There’s no habeas corpus here. Captivity overdetermined the condition of possibility for everyone’s life.** How people performed on a carceral continent was as varied as the “choices” made by us at Mario’s. Some fled the coast and trekked deeper into the interior to avoid notice and, with any luck, capture—the way DeNight kept to the corners of the restaurant where no one was likely to speak with him when he wasn’t serving his tables. Some made themselves indispensable (for as long as possible) to the White slavers by becoming slave hunters— like Nicolas and Sipho, and impimpis of the Inkatha Freedom Party. Some wore their prowess and pride on their sleeves and lashed out without a plan or foresight—like me. Some confided in the mistress in the hope, perhaps, of attaining some form of sanctuary, or for reasons they themselves could not fathom—like Doreen. **The essential Afropessimist point rests not in a moral judgment of the choices they made, but in an ethical assessment of the common dilemma they all shared—the questions that haunt the slave’s first waking moments: What will these White people do to my flesh today? How deep will they cut?** Some were captured and refused to live. Some sent their children to a different death, as in Beloved. The dreams of all these different captives could not be reconciled, but their place in the paradigm was the same. They woke up each morning with a deeper anxiety than the proletariat, the worker. The proletariat wakes up in the morning wondering, How much will I have to do today and how long will I have to do it? Exploitation and alienation morphed into an early morning ulcer. How much will the capitalist demand of me and how long will I have to do it? Again, the Slave wakes up in the morning wondering, What will these Humans do to my flesh? A hydraulics of anxiety that is very different than exploitation and alienation. If a can of tuna or a bucket of nails could speak, their essential questions would not revolve around how their labor power is being exploited, or how they are alienated from the value that they produce. Exploitation and alienation are not the grammar of their suffering. (How can one exploit an implement?) And the value that a tool helps produce never accrues to the tool. **For the Slave, the implement, exploitation and alienation are trumped by accumulation and fungibility. Slaves themselves are consumed, not their labor power. Slaves are implements, not workers. What Marx called “speaking implements”:** Mario and Riana’s speaking implements. Our response to captivity was as varied as the myriad choices that our ancestors made hundreds of years ago on that continent. But the question was the same: What will these White people do to my flesh? And the answer is the same: Anything they want. **There is no habeas corpus here,** Rebone warned. She didn’t know how right she was: for Black people there is no habeas corpus anywhere. Doreen knew this better than any of us. She negotiated her captivity by fainting: her unconscious attempt to save herself by throwing herself overboard. When she came to, she was staring up into the faces of all her masters, and me, a fellow slave. Freelance pallbearers took her body to the ambulance. She would live, when what she really may have wanted was to follow death into freedom; to jump ship before it docked. Who wouldn’t tell them what they wanted to hear? There’s no habeas corpus here. Doreen and the rest of us lived (if lived is the word) in a paradigm of violence that bore no analogy to the violence of exploitation and alienation suffered by the worker. Doreen was the first Black person specifically hired, and officially sanctioned, to handle money with her Black hands. White South Africans had hired her to break their libidinal laws—to violate the mainstays of their collective unconscious. Then some trickster in the alcove whispers in her ear what her intuition had not let her think out loud: that it was all a setup. **The Black people who worked at Mario’s were different ages, ethnicities, and genders. But these differences at the level of identity did not alter our sameness at the level of position. One does not position oneself in the world; one is born into a name that’s been chosen. Perhaps there was a moment of solidarity sparked by a common acknowledgment of our common position within social death.** If there was such a moment, it was splintered: The stern way Master schooled me in the locker room and the flickers of kindness he showed in the tensest situations, gestures that put his wife and his children in Venda, to whom he sent money each month, at risk. The way Nicolas and Sipho did not hurt me, or worse, when they had the chance; a deed for which they would have been exonerated and rewarded.

#### Only through embracement of disorder and incoherence via the alternative are we able create revolutionary politics that disrupt the generative mechanism of civil society.

Wilderson 20 [Frank B. Wilderson, professor of Drama and African American studies at the University of California, Irvine, “Afropessimism”, page 249-252, JMH]

Again, though this is a bond between Blacks and Whites (or, more precisely, between Black and non-Blacks), it is produced by a violent intrusion that does not cut both ways. Whereas the phobic bond is an injunction against Black psychic integration and Black filial and affilial relations, it is the lifeblood of White psychic integration and filial (which is to say, domestic) and affilial (or institutional) relations. For whoever says “rape” says Black; whoever says “prison” says Black; and whoever says “AIDS” says Black—the Negro is a phobogenic object: a past without a heritage, the map of gratuitous violence, and a program of complete disorder. If a social movement is to be neither social democratic nor Marxist, in terms of its structure of political desire, then it should grasp the invitation of social death embodied in Black beings. **If we are to be honest with ourselves, we must admit that the “~~Negro~~” “Black” has been inviting Whites, as well as civil society’s junior partners** (for example, Palestinians, Native Americans, Latinx) **to the dance of social death for hundreds of years, but few have wanted to learn the steps.** They have been, and remain today (even in the most anti-racist movements, like anti-colonial insurgency) invested elsewhere. Black liberation, as a prospect, makes radicalism more dangerous to the U.S. and the world. **This is not because it raises the specter of an alternative polity (such as socialism, or community control of existing resources), but because its condition of possibility and gesture of resistance function as a politics of refusal and a refusal to affirm, a program of complete disorder. One must embrace its disorder, its incoherence, and allow oneself to be elaborated by it, if indeed one’s politics are to be underwritten by a revolutionary desire.** What other lines of accountability are there when slaves are in the room? There is nothing foreign, frightening, or even unpracticed about the embrace of disorder and incoherence. The desire to be embraced, and elaborated, by disorder and incoherence is not anathema in and of itself. No one, for example, has ever been known to say, Gee whiz, if only my orgasms would end a little sooner, or maybe not come at all. Few so-called radicals desire to be embraced, and elaborated, by the disorder and incoherence of Blackness—and the state of political movements in the U.S. today is marked by this very Negrophobogenisis: Gee-whiz, if only Black rage could be more coherent, or maybe not come at all. Perhaps there is something more terrifying about the joy of Black than there is in the joy of sex (unless one is talking sex with a Negro). Perhaps coalitions today prefer to remain inorgasmic in the face of civil society—with hegemony as a handy prophylactic, just in case. If, **through this stasis or paralysis, they try to do the work of prison abolition, that work will fail, for it is always work from a position of coherence (such as the worker) on behalf of a position of incoherence of the Black: radical politics morphed into extensions of the master’s prerogative.** In this way, **social formations on the Left remain blind to the contradictions of coalitions between Humans and Slaves. They remain coalitions operating within the logic of civil society and function less as revolutionary promises than as crowding-out scenarios of Black antagonisms, simply feeding Black people’s frustration.** Whereas the positionality of the worker (whether a factory worker demanding a monetary wage, an immigrant, or a white woman demanding a social wage) gestures toward the reconfiguration of civil society, the positionality of the Black subject (whether a prison-slave or a prison-slave-in-waiting) gestures toward the disconfiguration of civil society. From the coherence of civil society, the Black subject beckons with the incoherence of civil war, a war that reclaims Blackness not as a positive value, but as a politically enabling site, to quote Fanon, of “absolute dereliction.” It is a “scandal” that rends civil society asunder. Civil war, then, becomes the unthought, but never forgotten, understudy of hegemony. It is a Black specter waiting in the wings, an endless antagonism that cannot be satisfied (via reform or reparation), but must nonetheless be pursued to the death. But lest we forget, this is not a question of volition. It is not as simple as waking up in the morning and deciding, in one’s conscious mind, to “do the right thing.” **For when we scale up from the terrain of the psyche to the terrain of armed struggle, we may be faced with a situation in which the eradication of the generative mechanism of Black suffering is something that is not in anyone’s interest.** Eradication of the generative mechanisms of Black suffering is not in the interest of Palestinians and Israelis, as my shocking encounter with my friend Sameer, on a placid hillside, suggests; because his anti-Black phobia mobilizes the fantasy of belonging that the Israeli state might otherwise strip him of. For him to secure his status as a relational being (if only in his unconscious), his unconscious must labor to maintain the Black as a genealogical isolate. “The shame and humiliation runs even deeper if the Israeli soldier was an Ethiopian Jew.” The Israelis are killing the Palestinians, literally; but psychic life, Human capacity for relations, is vouchsafed by a libidinal relay between them and their common labor to avoid ~~“niggerization”~~ [~~negroization~~] [racialization]  
(Fanon). **This relay is the generative mechanism that makes life life. It is also the generative mechanism of Black suffering and isolation. The end of this generative mechanism would mean the end of the world. We would find ourselves peering into the abyss.** This trajectory is too iconoclastic for working-class, post-colonial, and/or radical feminist conceptual frameworks. The Human need to be liberated in the world is not the same as the Black need to be liberated from the world; which is why even their most radical cognitive maps draw borders between the living and the dead. Finally**, if we push this analysis to the wall, it becomes clear that eradication of the generative mechanisms of Black suffering is also not in the interests of Black revolutionaries. For how can we disimbricate Black juridical and political desire from the Black psyche’s desire to destroy the Black imago, a desire that constitutes the psyche?** In short, bonding with Whites and non-Blacks over phobic reactions to the Black imago provides the Black psyche with the only semblance of psychic integration it is likely to have: the need to destroy a Black imago and love a White ideal. “In these circumstances, having a ‘white’ unconscious may be the only way to connect with—or even contain—the overwhelming and irreparable sense of loss. The intruding fantasy offers the medium to connect with the lost internal object, the ego, but there is also no ‘outside’ to this ‘real fantasy’ and the effects of intrusion are irreparable.” This raises the question, who is the speaking subject of Black insurgent testimony; who bears witness when the Black insurgent takes the stand? Who is writing this book?

#### Debate as a game is foundationally built of death and the recreation of narratives of black death. These attempts at story telling seek to make violence more legible in an attempt to find a conclusion to their story. Instead, every spectacle created within debate only feeds white Jouissance as debaters gain pleasure in playing the game and envisioning death with no reprieve.

Wilderson 20 [Frank B. Wilderson, professor of Drama and African American studies at the University of California, Irvine, “Afropessimism”, page 91-93, JMH]

If one asked Mary Epps why she bashed Patsey’s eye with a whiskey decanter or why she goaded Edwin Epps into whipping Patsey within an inch of her life, as he eventually does, even she would try to find a reason—Patsey seduced my husband—which would fall apart the moment it was brought to her attention that Patsey lived without consent, without, that is, the right to accept or deny Edwin and Mary access to her body. **As a slave Patsey has no right to sanctuary, sexual or otherwise.** The film tries to anchor the whippings that a Black woman receives in the rational explanations of jealousy and transgression. In other words, the narrative asks us to believe that the principal reason for so much mutilation of the flesh is contingent upon some inappropriate act, a transgression that can be named. We are told Mary Epps, the wife of a ruthless plantation owner, wants Patsey, a beautiful (of course, only the “beautiful” ones are wanted) and productive slave, beaten and sold because her husband creeps down from the mansion at night to rape Patsey (an act he, no doubt, sees as more amorous than violent). We are told that Solomon’s back is opened with a paddle and a whip because he could not be disciplined or because he (and other slaves) did not pick his quota of cotton for the day. Jealousy and transgression put the audience at ease, release them from the horror of having to think of this violence as pleasure without purpose—like an act of love or a song in the heart or skipping down the street when no one is looking, all the things that sustain Human life but don’t appear on the ledger. **What if anti-Black violence could be counted among the things that make life life, without registering as profit or loss?** What if jealousy and transgression are ruses, disguises that the real reasons for the violence hide behind? **If no contingency triggers this violence, how can it fit in a story? How do we make sense of a prelogical phenomenon like anti-Black violence? “I am in my pleasure.”** In other words, the whippings are a life force: like a song, or good sex without a procreative aim. **“Jouissance”** is the word that comes to mind. **A French word that means enjoyment, in terms both of rights and property, and of sexual orgasm.** (The latter has a meaning partially lacking in the English word “enjoyment.”) **Jouissance compels the subject to constantly attempt to transgress the prohibitions imposed on his or her enjoyment, to go beyond the pleasure principle. Jouissance is an anchor tenant of psychoanalysis.** But until the work of the critical theorists David Marriott, Jared Sexton, and Saidiya Hartman—that is to say, prior to an Afropessimist hijacking of psychoanalysis—devotees of Lacan and Freud had not made the link between jouissance and the regime of violence known as social death. This juxtaposition, unfortunately, takes place at a level of abstraction that is too high for narrative and the logic of storytelling. Unlike violence against the working class, which secures an economic order, or violence against non-Black women, which secures a patriarchal order, or violence against Native Americans, which secures a colonial order, **the jouissance that constitutes the violence of anti-Blackness secures the order of life itself; sadism in service to the prolongation of life. One thing that makes this sadism life-affirming and communal** (as opposed to destructive and individual**) is the fact that it is a family affair**. In his book, Solomon Northup recalls episodes of Patsey’s beat- ings with details that are crucial and missing from the film. “Mistress [Mary] Epps,” he writes, “stood on the piazza among her children gazing on the scene with an air of heartless satisfaction.” The scene that Solomon Northup paints of Mary Epps standing on the piazza brings to mind the musings of Mary Boykin Chesnut, the most cited chronicler of the American Civil War, who wrote, “Our men live all in one house with their wives and their concubines, and the mulattoes one sees in every family exactly resemble the white children . . . All the time they seem to think themselves patterns, models of husbands and fathers.” In the realm of the conscious mind, Mary Chesnut is as incensed by the licentious satisfaction White male slaveholders extract from Black women as Mary Epps is (in her conscious mind, as well). But Solomon Northup’s psychoanalytic labor indexes how, in the realm of the unconscious mind, this “heartless satisfaction” is the currency of men like Edwin Epps and their wives; despite the fact that only the former can secure his satisfaction in the open. **The point to be made is that this satisfaction is shared even if its expression is not.** Like her husband, Mary Epps is “in [her] pleasure”; and she is also with her children, who are in their pleasure as well. This generalization of satisfaction and pleasure, subtended by gratuitous violence against Black flesh, fans out from conventional sadism between sexual partners to a family gathering of adults and children of all ages, like the Eppses’ son, a boy of ten or twelve who rides his pony out to the cotton fields and “without discrimination . . . applies the raw hide, urging slaves forward with shouts and occasional profanity.” We would be wrong to think that the boy’s “urging slaves forward” lends purpose and legibility to the violence—it does not. Like any other child, the boy is at play. He is in his pleasure. Each time he rides his little pony to the fields, he compels an old man named Uncle Abram to be his cheering squad, his chorus, to “laugh . . . and commend him for being a thorough-going boy.”

#### Philosophical interventions into black histories are necessary to understand slavery and freedom as opposing but forever intertwined paradigms within racial capitalism.

**Leroy 21** [Justin Leroy, Assistant Professor at UC Davis, Co-Director, Mellon Research Initiative on Racial Capitalism, 2021 “Racial Capitalism and Black Philosophies of History”, Histories of Racial Capitalism, Columbia University Press, Pages 171-174, JMH]

The relationship between blackness and the philosophy of history began with disavowal. Amos Beman, a black reverend from Connecticut, was determined to find information on the history of Africa and its people. In 1843, he wrote to Noah Webster, the famous editor and dictionary compiler, no doubt hoping that one of the nation’s most learned men could give him the answers he was searching for. Webster replied, “of the wooly-haired Africans . . . there is no history and can be none.”3 Although Webster would not have been aware of it, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel had systematized this rejection of the possibility for African history in a series of lectures at the University of Berlin in the 1820s. Hegel concluded, “The ~~Negro~~ Black. . . exhibits the natural man in his completely wild and untamed state,” and that Africa “is no historical part of the World; it has no movement or development to exhibit.”4 For Hegel, history “shows the development of the consciousness of Freedom on the part of Spirit, and of the consequent realization of that Freedom.”5 This process unfolded across both time and space, beginning with what he described as despotism in the ancient Orient (freedom only for the despot), progressing through Greek and Roman antiquity (freedom for some), and culminating with the modern nations of Prussia and England (freedom for all). Hegel’s Negro, however, had “not yet attained to the realization of any substantial objective existence” and could have no awareness of the nature of freedom; he thus stood outside of history, “only as on the threshold.”6 Despite his ejection of blackness, Hegel’s philosophy of history remains foundational to commonsense understandings of how history works. In fact, his sense of the link between moral and historical progression has at times seemed to speak especially to black history—consider Martin Luther King, Jr.’s paraphrase of the abolitionist Theodore Parker, “the arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice.”7

For Amos Beman and for many who came after, seeking out the archives of black history was not merely about correcting factual omissions or writing more complete narratives. The recovery of such histories would have moral force, providing crucial tools in the struggle for racial justice. These archives would write black history and, in doing so, write blackness into history, thus bringing black people closer to freedom. The collector and bibliophile Arthur Schomburg captured this sentiment when he wrote, in 1925, “The American Negro must remake his past in order to make his future. . . . History must restore what slavery has taken away.”8 Recovering black history would be the bridge between the slave past and a freedom yet to come. Nearly a century after Schomburg wrote these words, there is a body of work on black history more magnificent than he probably could have imagined. Yet there is little doubt that this work has not—and cannot—restore what slavery took away.

**While figures such as Hegel and Webster attempted to cast Africa and Africans out of history, the production of countless black historical narratives has seemed to militate against their ultimate success**. It has been the tireless work of two centuries to recover the archives of black history and reject this foundational exclusion, rendering Africans and their descendants fit for the long march through history and toward freedom.9 Following this logic, black people enter history precisely (perhaps only) at the moment that they confirm its forward movement by claiming a place within its trajectory. Black history begins when there is progress from slavery toward freedom— recall Schomburg’s rhetorical opposition, “history must restore what slavery has taken away.” Even though this type of historical progress seems to combat the violence of being excluded from history, it nonetheless confirms Hegel’s argument that history consists of the very movement toward freedom. Although many aspects of black history are illuminated by adhering to Hegel’s framework (King did, after all, successfully organize actual marches for freedom), others, such as Smith’s and Douglass’s hesitations about emancipation, are obscured and rendered illegible. And accounts of black history that boldly claim Africans’ and Africa’s historical importance remain contentious when they would trouble the story of history’s forward movement.10 **Thus, it might be instructive to dwell on what it means to linger at the threshold, remaining on the edges of history (at least certain kinds of history**). If what links King and Hegel is a faith that through the unfolding of history a freedom yet unrealized will be forthcoming, it is a faith that cannot account for the intractability of blackness. In other words**, the perpetual movement closer to freedom, the moral arc of the universe bending toward justice—these models of history are not the only ways, or even the most useful ways, for making sense of slavery and its abolition.**

Reckoning with slavery and what came after requires new philosophies of history. Saidiya Hartman has used the term “afterlife of slavery” to describe the ways “black lives are still imperiled and devalued by a racial calculus and political arithmetic that were entrenched centuries ago.”11 It is an apt formulation that suggests a different, counterintuitive relationship between past and present, slavery and freedom. To ponder slavery’s afterlife is to be open to the possibility that “the distinction between the past and the present founders on the interminable grief engendered by slavery and its aftermath . . . then and now coexist; we are coeval with the dead.”12 **The notion of the afterlife is an interruption of progressive historical time. Things are supposed to live and then die, and if they live again or don’t quite die, it distorts any sense of proper sequence**. That sense of distortion is productive. In the words of Michel-Rolph Trouillot, “slavery here is a ghost, both the past and the living presence; and the problem of historical representation is how to represent the ghost.”13 **Ian Baucom has argued that contemporary finance capitalism is a repetition or iteration of the financialized slave trade of the eighteenth century and that, by extension, “the present time . . . inherits its nonimmediate past by intensifying it.**”14 Each of these philosophies of history is a reminder that history can move in a multitude of ways, whether cyclical, static, cumulative, palimpsestic, or something else entirely.

It is important to emphasize that nothing inherent to black history is resistant to the movement toward freedom, and nothing inherent to blackness makes it coterminous with the unending violence of slavery. To insist otherwise would be to reinscribe Hegel’s beliefs about the historical stasis of Africa and the impossibility of black freedom. Rather, **the historical formation of racial capitalism has bequeathed slavery an afterlife and rendered the forward movement of emancipation fraught**.

Racial capitalism places slavery within a broad, protean set of conditions that emerged out of but were not reliant upon slavery. These conditions continued to shape black freedom after emancipation. Racial capitalism’s adaptability—operating through the idiom of freedom as easily as it did through that of slavery—is what makes it so useful for theorizing a black philosophy of history. Using the language of racial capitalism to describe what came both before and after emancipation emphasizes historical continuities over breaks, without disavowing historical dynamism or making slavery itself the only determinant of black history.

At times, the failures of emancipation were so great that black writers used the language of slavery even in its legal absence as a way of articulating a philosophy of history. Each emancipatory moment in the nineteenth-century British Atlantic world, whether in the U.S. North, the British West Indies, or the U.S. South, was premised on a form of freedom that transformed the primary vehicle for black subjugation from a relationship between capitalism and slavery into one between capitalism and freedom. Using an archive composed of black disappointment with freedom, the remainder of this chapter challenges the moral claims embedded within narratives about the progress from slavery to freedom and argues that racial capitalism ensured the transferability of systems of inequality beyond the slavery/freedom divide.15

### 1NC – Economy

#### Whiteness is an existential threat— (let’s just do the extinction debate here)

Preston, 17—Cass School of Education and Communities, University of East London (John, “Rethinking Existential Threats and Education,” Competence Based Education and Training (CBET) and the End of Human Learning pp 61-93, dml)

After Marxism, the second existential threat is one of negation and elimination of the subject and here I shall consider conceptions of this from CRT and black existentialism.

Various contemporary educational theories consider the equity and social justice implications of different forms of education with regard to race. The work of Sleeter and Grant (2007) makes the ethical and pragmatic case for multicultural social justice as a key value of education. This has been followed in contemporary work that attempts to consider the various dimensions of social justice. For example, Bhopal and Shain (2014), consider the twin axis of recognition and redistribution as goals of education. Other work examines the role of social distancing from the ‘Other’ by white students as a dynamic process in which Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic (BAME) and working-class students are disadvantaged. In many ways denial of social justice in terms of lack of resources, recognition or access to social space can be considered to be a form of dehumanisation. However, whilst work on social justice and education might consider the lack of humanity in these systems of oppression (applying concepts such as ‘bare life’, Lewis 2006; or ‘othering’ Lebowitz 2016) they do not consider directly existential threats. Threats to humanity on the basis of difference may arise from totalitarianism as much as through war and threats to the environment. The various genocides which have taken place throughout human history have often had a racial, or ethnic, cleansing purpose to them. They have been eugenic threats that are based upon spurious ideas of genetic and moral superiority. Writers on race from Fanon to Du Bois have considered that the threat posed to racial groups may be existential and that there is a short step from psychic, to real extermination. The negation of individuals through economic, social and psychological processes allows for their physical extermination. Du Bois (2014) deals explicitly with existential threat in his short story ‘The Comet’ where humanity is almost wiped out by a threat from space, leaving only a small number of people to carry on. As one of the survivors of the comet is an African American, this leads Du Bois to consider the state of race relations in the USA. The implication of the story is that the existential threat of the comet (which allows the African American character to live in a world entirely free of racial prejudice) allows release from the existential threat of eugenic attitudes. Building on Du Bois, in other work (Preston 2012), I have considered the ways in which preparation for threats, including existential threats such as pandemics and nuclear war, has been in many ways eugenic in that it prioritises the survival of some more than others based upon criteria which include race and ethnicity (Preston 2012). Preparing for disasters and emergencies often prioritises the interests of white people above those of other ethnic minorities. One reason for this is tacit intentionality which means that policymakers and practitioners do not consider human diversity in considering how people may respond to disaster. Policy is often biased as policymakers expect that people will be ‘like me’ which (at least in the UK and USA) means they will often be white, middle-class, educated, English-speaking men. In planning for threats, there will be various ways in which such biases are included. For example, they may not consider publishing advice in a number of languages, the resources necessary to survive a disaster, the mobility of people and the attitudes of emergency responders. This is unwitting prejudice in that by not considering diversity they are actually making it less likely for BAME people to survive, or protect themselves against, the disaster.

Although these biases may lead to a gradient in terms of survival by different groups in a disaster, they do not appear to relate to existential threat. However, existential threat can be interpreted in a different way in perspectives from critical whiteness studies and CRT.

In critical whiteness studies, whiteness is taken to be not a racial identity, but rather a system of power and oppression (Leonardo 2009). Whiteness was created as an identity not simply as a mode of social classification but as a way of exploiting and controlling others. There are obviously periods in history where this was objectively the case. During slavery in the USA, for example, whiteness was used as a means to distinguish between those people who had the right to own property (whites) and those who could not (Africans), Moreover, whiteness was the obverse of property in that only Africans could ‘be’ assets or property. Enslaved Africans were therefore treated as property and did not have access to the basic rights which would constitute humanity in American society (such as access to education, the right to own property, the right to decide who they should have relationships with). There are obviously parallels between this experience and holocaust when Jewish people (and other individuals) were dehumanised by the Nazis and denied access to basic resources. During imperialism there was also a period whereby other races were categorised to be less worthy than white people and this provided the justification for colonial control, exploitation and often extermination.

Advocates of whiteness studies go further than this and consider that whiteness is not merely a past system of oppression, but a continuing system of white supremacy (Leonardo 2009). The economy and society is comprised in such a way that white people will usually benefit, and BAME people will usually not. This is not only an economic and social system but also a psychological system whereby existence as a full human depends upon one’s racial categorisation. This idea has its roots in the work of Fanon (1986) who wrote that black identity was shaped by the white gaze, but also contemporary writers also consider the notion of whiteness as ‘death’, a categorisation that is rooted in past oppression and extermination, whose remnants exist to this day. This perspective on race and existence leads us to consider what is meant by life, and whether we are not currently living to our full potential (as Marxists would also propose) when existential threat is actually amongst us. For Marxists this would be the expansion of the ‘social universe’ of capitalism that flows between and through us, ‘capitalising humanity’. For critical whiteness studies, this existential threat would be one of whiteness and the negation of existence for a racially classified group of people.

In order to make this idea of constant existential threat more tangible (although the term is not used) critical race theorists use what are known as ‘counter-stories’ to consider how racial dynamics might develop in the future, or to highlight inequalities in the present (Delgado 1996). Derrick Bell (1992) who is considered to be the founder of CRT, uses a much cited counter-story ‘The Space Traders’ to consider the ways in which black people’s lives are classed as being not equal to those of whites in the USA. In ‘The Space Traders’ a race of aliens offer the USA a trade: all of America’s black citizens in return for unlimited, environmentally friendly, energy and technology. After some debate, the American people vote on the proposal and decide to give up all of America’s black citizens to the space traders in return for the futuristic technical goods. Of course, Bell is proposing an analogy between slavery in the past and the present situation of black people in the USA, and perhaps even suggesting that such a thing might happen again. On another level, though, there is also the idea that the existence of black people in America is categorised at a different level of metaphysical worth to that of white people. That life could be traded so cheaply, even plausibly (in the thought experiment) makes us pause for thought in terms of how we classify existential threat.

Although the relationship between CRT and black existentialism may not always seem obvious we can see that there is a nihilistic streak in the work of Bell (1992) with regard to the prospects for survival. In addition, the drawing on the work of Fanon by authors who use CRT as part of their work which shows the perpetual violence encountered by people of colour in education as well as the enduring influence of Du Bois on CRT (Delgado and Stefancic 2001) shows the close connection between the two theories. What links CRT and black existentialism is a basic concern with existence and the meaning of human life under constant threat that can be thought to underpin any concern with social justice. From CRT and black existentialism, we therefore see that existential threat is one of negation through economic, social and political systems and there are degrees of graduation between these forms of existential threats and actual genocide or extermination. The links between these points and CBET might be considered as obtuse but, as we shall see in the next chapter, systems of education can play a role in forms of negation. Obviously, there are social justice implications in the way in which people are treated in terms of race and ethnicity in education. The ‘triaging’ by race and ethnicity of access to education courses, the ways in which certain groups are rationed access to educational routes and the fragility of links between education and the labour market for BAME groups are all part of marginalisation, in which vocational education plays a large part. As part of this process, and probably not coincidentally, these groups are also more likely to find themselves in vocational, CBET courses. However, social justice is not the whole story, and there is a more profound form of equality associated with the right to existence. It is this that CBET threatens through the reduction of the subject to a digital organism as I will show in the next chapter.

**Embracing extinction as a narrative—not biological—phenomenon is a prerequisite to disrupting white desires**

**Schotten, 18**—Associate Professor of Political Science and an affiliated faculty in Women's and Gender Studies, University of Massachusetts-Boston (C. Heike, “SOCIETY MUST BE DESTROYED,” *Queer Terror: Life, Death, and Desire in the Settler Colony* pg 108-111, dml)

How, then, to articulate and effect the radical abolitionism of revolutionary desire without getting caught up in the stranglehold of futurism? Futurism’s inescapability means **not simply that politics is irredeemable** and **reform insufficient**, but also that the deconstructive or queer practice of **subversive redeployment** is a **naïve delusion** regarding our own ability to **think** and **act outside** or **beyond futurist mandates**. As Edelman simultaneously argues and demonstrates, futurism’s **stifling determination** of the very domain of the political itself means that **any** and **all resistance is always already coopted**, while revolt is an impossibly queered space that is simultaneously named and foreclosed by the death drive. Yet Edelman’s solution to this dilemma is to recommend neither **capitulation** to futurism nor some sort of **compromise** with it but rather an **accession to its worst nightmares** in an embrace of queerness that will **destroy it from within**, “shortcircuit[ing] the social in its present form.”74 In other words, rather than **defend** society, which Edelman finds indefensible, much less **deconstruct** society, as a queer critique of norms might recommend, or even (dear me!) **redeem** society, by **entreating a utopian vision** that imagines the overcoming of all suffering and oppression, Edelman instead declares we must **destroy society**. And we do so by **taking up**, **inhabiting**, or “**embracing**” the very “**death**” that futurism **inevitably produces** as the queer by- product of its social ordering. He thus **dismisses utopianism** in the name of an **immediacy** that “**the future stop here**,”75 challenging us to live life as an **insistent presentism** that will **do nothing else afterward but die**, and casting this alliance with death as the **act of revolutionary resistance**.

While Dean vociferously rejects this “embrace” because of its psychoanalytic impossibility, Edelman, I think, is well aware of this fact and recommends it precisely for this reason, a contradiction that becomes more intelligible if understood politically rather than solely psychoanalytically. Indeed, Edelman’s recommendation of this “embrace” is a clearly political position— despite what he may say otherwise— in two specific, complex ways. First, recall the historicization of Edelman’s argument provided in chapter 2, wherein I characterized his version of “politics” as a distinctly modern, European, settler colonial sovereignty. An important consequence of this historicization is that, even in his allegedly non- or antipolitical advocacy, Edelman **cannot actually be rejecting politics per se** since, despite his own claims to the contrary, there is **no such thing**. Abolishing modern politics or futurist politics is **not equivalent to abolishing politics as such** and could only mean as much if **every modernity were European modernity**, if **every politics were a sovereign biopolitics**, and if **every temporality were futurist**. To understand Edelman’s refusal of politics as a **refusal of any and all politics existing anywhere** is to **go along with** his unmarked **universalist presentation of** reproductive **futurism** as the **logic of everything existing everywhere all the time**, itself a frequent conceit of psychoanalytic frames.76 But if futurism is the **temporality of modern biopolitical sovereignty**, it **immediately becomes clear that other temporalities are possible**, even as other versions of politics **must necessarily exist**.77 As Audra Simpson argues, for example, “Indigenous political orders are quite simply, first, . . . **prior** to the project of founding, of settling, and as such **continue to point**, in their persistence and vigor, to the **failure of the settler project to eliminate them**, and yet are subjects of dispossession, of removal, but their polities serve as **alternative forms of legitimacy** and **sovereignties** to that of the settler state.”78

Historicizing futurist politics in this way means that alternative temporalities or political schemas **exist** but are queer(ed) and **represented as existential threats** to it: as **unintelligible**, **unlivable**, **immoral**, **backward**, and “**savage**.” While Edelman does indeed conflate all politics with futurism, such that his call for the destruction of politics seems to portend an unthinkable and intolerable nihilism, it is nevertheless the case that, once situated historically, the advocacy that queers **accede to the deathly positioning** to which they are always already relegated by reproductive futurism is **not some sort of unthinkable**, **antipolitical vision**, nor is it an **advocacy of suicide** or **some sort of necropolitical imperative**. Rather, in the context of a **European modernity** built on the colonization of most of the rest of the world, Edelman’s embrace of death can be read as a **prescription** for an **anticolonial allegiance to** and **alliance with those forms of politics** and **temporality that thwart**, **refuse**, or **deny futurism’s colonial mandates**. No Future’s embrace of the “death drive,” in other words, is a **championing of resistant futures** and **political systems** that **show up as death from a futurist perspective** and are various surrogates for the broad, structural category he designates as “queer.” In advocating for a revolution on behalf of queers and arguing for an embrace of queerness, then, Edelman is very much arguing in the name of something— not the future, of course, and certainly not life in any biological sense. But he is also **not quite arguing in the name of death in a biological sense**, either. Rather, he is arguing that “the dead” should “live,” that is, that they “come to life” (or insistently exist) and **animate the destruction of the settler order** that they are always already **consigned by that social order to symbolize**. This is, in other words, an argument for indigenous existence as resistance to settler sovereignty. Siting and situating futurism historically make clear that Edelman’s recommended accession to queerness/death is another name for radical resistance to sovereign biopolitics and that, **far from nihilism**, it is an **emancipatory** and **decolonizing political recommendation** of the first order. In this sense, even Edelman’s own project is wedded to life, albeit a life that is unlivable as life, which is the status of native life within settler colonial regimes. As he says in recommendation of embracing the death drive, “political self- destruction inheres in the only act that counts as one: the act of resisting enslavement to the future in the name of having a life.”79 Edelman’s opposition to the political can therefore be reread as a **wholesale opposition** to the sovereign biopolitics of European modernity and an **imagining of the death of that political order** as the **content of revolutionary politics**. Indeed, his suggestion of a necessary “counterproject”80 to futurism makes clear that his recommendation of this refusal is the **essential**, **necessary**, and **definitive act of political resistance**, even as it is a **championing of the lives** and **political temporalities** of those **determined to be emissaries of death**.

Importantly, this destructive refusal is a threat that redounds back on Edelman himself and on **all of us who share** his **habitation of futurist politics** in Western modernity (or who were ourselves **trained in the history of that thought**). This is the second, complex way that Edelman’s rejection of politics is in fact a **maximally political entreaty**. The tension at work in Edelman’s inevitably futurist call to end futurism means that he is also and necessarily calling for the destruction of his own revolutionary project and subjective/authorial position. This is a queer revolution that **queers the aims of revolution itself**, divesting itself of futurism even as it speaks in its name. As a political act, it amounts “to **put[ting] one’s foot down at last**, **even if doing so costs us the ground on which we**, **like all others**, **must stand**.”81 It is a revolutionary desire that seeks to dispossess revolution of its failed foundations without thereby relinquishing either revolution or its animating desire. This revolutionary discourse exceeds the parameters of revolution as it has hitherto unfolded in modernity, even as it promises a liberation from modernity’s— and liberation’s— moralizing constraints.

This paradoxical, queer(ed) revolution is therefore **unmistakably tied to death**, and in more than one way: not only because queerness is the structural position of anything antisociety and antilife; not only because it **demands the destruction of all that has been construed as life** (as **valuable life**, as **worthy life**, as life **worth living** and **endowed with a future**); but also because the revolutionary call to destroy society and its futurist temporality will **necessarily result in the eradication of its own revolutionary demand in the process**. This is why Edelman’s queer political project **can never recommit us to sovereignty**, whether of a charismatic revolutionary leader, a vanguard revolutionary class, or a theological vision of an allpowerful monarch, much less the **sovereign subject**, whose **very European coherence requires futurism’s linear temporality**. It can commit us **only to the destruction of these things**, as well as to the **eradication of our own commitments precisely to that very destruction** if, as, and when they **threaten to become the next crushing futurist ideal**. Edelman’s formulation of the **impossible** yet **wholly revolutionary goal** of refusing futurism— a refusal achievable only in a future that lies beyond its textual articulation and summary rejection there— offers a **rich** and **provocative articulation** of a revolutionary desire that seeks to **dispossess revolution of its very foundations**, even as it speaks in its name.

#### The presumption that markets can be post-racial as a matter of inclusion is an attempt to efface history and rescue race from blackness, located as absent relationality or agency.

Dumas 13 (Michael J., Assistant Professor at the University of California, Berkeley in the Graduate School of Education and the African American Studies Department, “’Waiting for Superman’ to save black people: racial representation and the official antiracism of neoliberal school reform,” Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education, 34:4, 2013)

The rise of neoliberalism in the 1980s and 1990s shifted the relationship between governmentality and race; while in earlier periods, the state positioned itself as the leader in advancing antiracism, under neoliberal multiculturalism , it is neoliberal economic policies and ideological formations that are seen to resolve the problem of racism. The market, in this hegemonic frame, knows neither race nor racism, and is therefore regarded as best suited to facilitate racial equality. Neoliberal multiculturalism promises to usher in the post-racial period, by nurturing a new global citizenship centered around economic participation. ‘ In short ’ , Melamed contends, ‘neoliberal multiculturalism has portrayed an ethic of multiculturalism to be the spirit of neoliberalism ’ (p. 42). In doing so, neoliberal multiculturalism abandons any explicit mention of race. While liberal multiculturalism employed discourses of equity, diversity and freedom, ‘ now open societies and economic freedoms ... and consumerist diversity signify multicultural rights for individuals and for corporations ’ (p. 43; italics in original). Neoliberal multiculturalism is still attentive to racial difference and recognizes inequitable outcomes, but explains these differences as essentially not about race or (in) justice, but individual and group choices. As Melamed explains: Neoliberal-multicultural racialization has made this disparity appear fair by ascribing racialized privilege to neoliberalism ’ s beneficiaries and racialized stigma to its dispossessed. In particular, it has valued its beneficiaries as multicultural, reasonable, law-abiding, and good global citizens and devalued the dispossessed as monocultural, backward, weak, and irrational – unfit for global citizenship because they lack the proper neoliberal subjectivity. ( 2009 , p. 44) In contrast to black stigmatization under liberal multiculturalism, here the focus is on the distance between black subjects and the market. Through the neoliberal-multicultural lens, we can still feel sympathy to the extent that these subjects are perceived as being prevented from participating in the market. However, if they reject opportunities to participate in the market, no matter how rigged that system may be, then our sympathies can be justifiably withheld. Any argument that the economic sphere is already regulated by racial privilege will fall on deaf ears, as the market is already presumed to be multicultural and racially ethical (i.e. post -racial) on its face. I want to suggest that, even in a neoliberal-multicultural period, we can still identify elements of racial liberalism and liberal multiculturalism. History is never erased or transcended; dimensions of the previous periods are evident in our national-racial imagination and in the racial representations that inform and are informed by that imagination. Waiting for Superman as a cultural and political product Near the beginning of Waiting for Superman (Guggenheim, 2010 ), Harlem Children ’ s Zone founder and so-called education ‘ reformer ’ , Geoffrey Canada, recalls his childhood disappointment in learning that Superman is not real. ‘ Even in the depth of the ghetto ’ ,he explains to the off-camera interviewer, ‘ you thought, he ’ s coming. I just don ’ t know when, because he always shows up and he saves all the good people ’ . As he speaks, images of a young Canada fade to black, interspersed with images of George Reeves as the hero in tights in the 1950s TV series, Adventures of Superman : I asked my mom, do you think Superman is – she said, Superman is not real ... and I said, what do you mean, he ’ s not real? And she thought I was crying because it ’ s like, Santa Claus is not real, and I was crying because there was no one coming with enough power to save us. In inspiring the title of the controversial documentary, Canada presents an image of a poor urban black community without a sense of hope, innocent but helpless in the face of social, economic and spatial marginalization. A people in need of a savior, the young black boy reckons, would do well to appeal for help to the ultimate all-American (white) superhero. Here, his city neighborhood becomes constructed as an uninhabitable jungle (Leonardo & Hunter, 2007 ). Unlike in some rightist interpretations, the black residents of Canada ’ s ghetto are not to blame for their condition, but instead are victims of something unnamed, a tragic historical accident. Blameless, they earn our sympathies; however, they clearly do not have enough agencies to help themselves. Or as Canada suggests, poor African Americans are so far gone, their salvation may require someone with superhuman powers. The producers of Waiting for Superman use Canada ’ s childhood memory to frame the film ’ s heartbreaking, liberal racial narrative, in which racial inequities are bemoaned without any acknowledgment of racism, (good) people of color eschew collectivist racial politics, and black subjects in particular are quick to point out their own personal moral and emotional failures as the cause of their own low educational aspirations and attainment. Waiting for Superman is significant as a cultural and political product, because it has been largely embraced by corporate education reformers like wealthy philanthropists Bill Gates and Eli Broad, and because of its harsh critique of teacher unions and uncritical praise for private educational-entrepreneurial ventures like KIPP and Teach for America. Although the film generated a massive critical response from academics and progressive education advocates (see, for example, http://www.notwaitingforsuperman.org ), it enjoyed a generally sympathetic and often enthusiastic response everywhere else, from glowing newspaper and magazine stories, to favorable coverage by influential media personalities like Oprah Winfrey and Katie Couric. Waiting for Superman is also important, because it is perhaps the most influential popular-discursive effort to advance a new managerialism in education reform. Manage- rialism, as Michael Apple ( 2006 ) explains is led by an emerging group of middle-class professionals committed to using business models of profit, competition and efficiency to ‘ reform ’ education (and other public institutions and functions). This entails privatizing some schools, and financially and politically undermining remaining public institutions, which are then forced to compete with these marketized schools. Ultimately, then, the argument can be made that private entities can more effectively deliver services that have previously been understood as public, as part of our collective responsibility for the public good. Managerialism is ‘ an ideal project ’ , Apple contends, ‘ merging the language of empowerment, rational choice, efficient organization, and new roles for managers all at the same time ’ (p. 25). Waiting for Superman is, in effect, a managerialist manifesto for education in the United States. What we learn in examining racial representations in the film is exactly how mangerialism aims to win for the rightist project a certain innocence vis à vis racism, and more, a sense that racial progress depends on adopting conservative ideology and reform policies. The story arc of Waiting for Superman , its primary suspense, centers on a competitive public lottery system in which children and their families vie for a severely limited number of student spots in highly-regarded charter schools. It is The Hunger Games in reverse; here, those not selected are presumed to be the unfortunate ones, condemned to suffering and abuse, while the masses watch. And like that blockbuster motion picture, Waiting for Superman is a cultural product, not simply a documentation of truth, or policy, or everyday life. The filmmakers construct a dramatic plot, with messages embedded in the images and also made explicit in the text. We meet the families, hear them share their struggles and dreams, and explain what they believe accounts for their own educational and/or social marginality. The filmmakers intend to evoke enough sympathy that as the film comes to its dramatic final scenes, we are emotionally invested in the outcome, anxious to discover if the students will be offered admission, as the number of still available seats becomes smaller and smaller. In most cases, the families experience crushing disappointment, which allows opportunities for wrenching close-ups of terrified eyes, tear-stained cheeks, and hands still clenching strips of paper with losing numbers. To a great degree, the filmmakers need, perhaps the audience too needs, or at least desires, to see suffering. Not only does it help the filmmakers make their argument about the state of public education, but it is also better theater, more compelling entertainment. Ultimately, our own humanity is affirmed, because we care so much about these strangers on the screen. In one particularly moving scene, we see a Latina mother, Maria, touring a Harlem charter school where she hopes her first-grade son, Francisco, will win a spot, to escape his low-resourced school in the South Bronx. Maria is clearly impressed with the resources of the charter school, and looks longingly at the warm, inviting classrooms. ‘ I don ’ t care if we have to wake up at 5 o ’ clock in the morning in order to get there at 7:45 ’ , she says, almost plaintively. ‘ That ’ s what we will do ’ . But, as the New York Times later reported (Otterman, 2010 ), when this scene was filmed, Maria already knew that Francisco would not get to attend this school. The scene was staged after the lottery, in order to ‘ see her reaction to the school, and her genuine emotion ’ , according to director Davis Guggenheim. For him, the scene was ‘ real ’ because the pain and longing in her eyes revealed her excitement about the possibility of having her son attend the charter school, although it might also be argued that they exploited her pain for their own purposes. It is certainly not uncommon for documentary filmmakers to re-enact and re-order scenes; my point here is to underscore that Waiting for Superman is produced , and produced in ways which evoke not only specific emotions, but produce and reproduce certain cultural discourses and ideological formations. As a racial cultural product, the film provides images of racialized bodies and differences that seem natural largely because they draw upon the familiar or the popular, that which we already accept about race, and more specifically here, blackness. As Herman Gray ( 2005 ) explains, ‘ the movement of black images and representation is never free of cultural and social traces of the condition of their production, circulation, and use ’ (p. 21). Hence, what I want to highlight in my analysis of the film is the ways in which black social actors take their (expected) place within the broader ideological conditions of official antiracisms – speaking, gazing and even moving on screen in support of that grander narrative. As I have hinted, if not said explicitly thus far, neoliberal multiculturalism, in conjunction with managerialism, brings an inherent effort to move beyond the black- white racial paradigm. This is more than an acknowledgment of a fuller plane of racial diversity, but an ideological position in which ‘ black ’ is understood as anachronistic, passé and a threat to national progress. Jared Sexton ( 2008 ) is worth quoting at length: Modernizing the nation – at least the segment of the nation with the potential to be ‘ more than black ’ or simply to move ‘ beyond black ’– and liberating it from the deadening weight of the past requires that the signature of its persistence ... be effaced. In this light, multiracialism can be read ... as an element of the ascendant ideology of colorblindness, but it is not thereby identical to it. Its target is not race per se, since multiracialism is still very much a politics of racial identity ... but rather the categorical sprawl of blackness in particular and the insatiable political demand it presents to a nominally postemancipation society. ( 2008 ,p.6) Neoliberal multiculturalism, or what Sexton calls multiracialism, seeks to rescue racial identity from blackness, which is seen as largely responsible for giving race its offensive and oppositional signification. The neoliberal-multicultural cultural product, then, finds effective ways to situate blackness and black bodies as absent of rationality or agency, and black racial politics an ineffective explanation of, or solution to persistent racial inequity. I am not suggesting that there is a direct line between racial representation and racial intent. That is, my aim is not to provide evidence that the film is racist, or that the filmmakers were motivated by racism. Rather, my argument is that the film was produced, and enters a field of already existing cultural productions, in which race and blackness have already been and continue to be imagined discursively, and in which black bodies are situated materially, disproportionately among the poorest and least regarded. What becomes important and potentially destructive about Waiting for Superman is the extent to which its representations reproduce and reify antiblack imaginations, ideologies and sentiments, even as the filmmakers claim to have offered a cultural product – an officially antiracist cultural product – that advocates for poor black people and other marginalized racial groups.

#### The identification of a ‘China Threat’ cannot be separated from the colonial desires they satisfy and military powers they benefit.

Pan 13, Chengxin Pan, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Deakin University, Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics Western Representations of China’s Rise, 2013, pg. 82-83

Consequently, for all the claims of the 'China threat’ paradigm to be scientific knowledge and objective truth, it has its roots in power and is well-suited to the service of power. By taking note of the power/knowledge nexus in the construction and function of the China threat knowledge. I do not suggest that every single piece of work in the 'China threat' genre is written under the decree of the Pentagon in exchange for funding and/or political patronage. As noted above, the nexus often takes multiple forms, some of which are subtler, less visible and less direct than others. Indeed, it is in the interest of both knowledge and power that their liaison be kept as covert as possible. This is what I-oucaull means by the "subtle mechanisms' in the production of knowledge where the exercise of power 'becomes capillary".'" In his account of the relationship between the state, the foundations, and international and area studies during the Cold War, Cumings used the term 'going capillary' to describe how, through small, everyday and local avenues, such as decisions on who gets tenure, who edits prestigious journals, which research project gets funded, and which textbooks are adopted, power was able to maintain its presence so that "people do things without being told, and often without knowing the influences on their behavior". 3 Also, once taking on a life of its own, knowledge can span an intertextual, disciplinary and institutional web within which it can self-generate, ostensibly removing itself a step further from power. Thus far, I have critically examined the power/know ledge/desire nexus in the case of the 'China threat1 paradigm. In doing so, I do not imply that the solution lies in the pursuit of pure knowledge and neutral scholarship on the part of those China watchers, who should shun government agencies, which in tuni should stop funding social science research altogether. In the fields of social sciences at least, there is no such thing as pure knowledge, disconnected totally from desire and power. Indeed, as examined at the beginning of this book, pure social knowledge is neither possible nor even desirable. I am not against the power/knowledge/desire nexus per se; rather, my point is that we, as producers of knowledge, should guard against the possibility of being misused and abused by power which often serves special interests. We should be self-conscious and sensitive to the consequences—however unintended or even well-intended—of our knowledge as practice. If all knowledge is linked to power in one way or another, it may beg the question of why the "China threat\* paradigm has been singled out here for criticism. The reason, I submit, is that not all knowledge/power nexuses arc equal in terms of their intertcxtual influence or practical and moral implications. As noted above, associated with the 'China threat' knowledge has been a particular kind of political economy of fear. It not only lays the discursive foundation for military Keynesianism, but also has profound and even dangerous repercussions for Sino-Western relations in general and US-China relations in particular. When acted upon by foreign policy-makers, the "China threat' paradigm runs the risk of turning into a self-fulfilling prophecy, an issue which will be examined in the next chapter.

#### Any risk of a link to the K means you vote neg on presumption---The China threat is not rooted in POLICY, but in an ideology of anti-blackness that began with the Middle Passage

Young book worm 13 (Tag Archives: Anti-Blackness [Bodies, Silence, and Multiracialism: Challenges of Solidarity Between POC](https://loudmouthedbookworm.wordpress.com/2013/08/10/bodies-silence-and-multiracialism-challenges-of-solidarity-between-poc/), https://loudmouthedbookworm.wordpress.com/tag/anti-blackness/)

There is a shared historical context in that exploitation is exploitation, oppression is oppression, etc is etc, and everything feeds back into and upholds the same multivaried and mulitifaceted structure of disparate, yet intersecting and inextricable, systems of oppression that together make up the structure White Supremacist capitalist heteropatriarchy, ie kyriarchy. But it’s not the same. It’s just not. Sexton, drawing on the words of another scholar, puts it best in his lecture. To paraphrase, it is a very different thing to be coming from a slave population than an immigrant population, no matter how lowly such immigrants are regarded. I don’t like getting into Oppression Olympics, mainly because I think playing the game of who had/has it worse is unproductive in most instances. But the fact remains: the historical and ongoing manifestations of anti-Blackness in this country, from the dehumanizing traumas and racial-sexual terror of the Middle Passage, to their reiteration, revisitation and reconstruction under chattel slavery, sharecropping, white neighborhood organizations, Jim Crow, redlining, the Drug War, and the PIC is incomparable to what has been endured by any other marginalized racial group in this country. The exceptionalism of anti-Blackness does not arise from it being a “worse” form of oppression than others Rather, it is anti-Blackness’ foundational role in the construction of White Supremacy that makes it indispensable to that system. Scott Nakagawa put it best, [“anti-black racism is the fulcrum of white supremacy”](http://www.changelabinfo.com/2012/05/04/blackness-is-the-fulcrum/#.Ufl89I3AoZU). That is to say, White Supremacy is particularly reliant on anti-Blackness because of the historical intimacy the two share in their concurrent formation. The racialization of persons of Middle Eastern descent and of Muslim faith, East Asian/Pacific descent, South Asian descent, South Pacific descent, and Hispanic/Latino origin have their roots in this primary, intimate racialization of conqueror and conquered, master and slave. The birth of African slavery was also Europe’s first foray into colonialism. Later, it was slavery, an institution reliant on captivity, commodification, debasement, and racial-sexual terror to maintain a greater system of forced labor, genocidal expansion, and economic extraction, that provided the capital and the labor necessary to the preservation and projection of an intercontinental empire conceived of and realized in the name of White Supremacy. An empire that has persisted to this day, in spite of great ruptures. Blackness has a unique relationship to Whiteness. As Sexton mentions, paraphrasing once more, it is possible to be anti-Black and not anti-X, but it is not possible to be anti-X and not anti-Black. This fact is present in everyone’s life. For example, I am a person of color. However, I can still participate in anti-Blackness. More than that, I may do so and benefit from it, whether in housing, employment, education, or a couple other things. Even though I’ll never have White Privilege, I can still take a few chips home if I play my cards right. Latasha Harlin, 15, was shot dead in LA by Soon Ja Du, a Korean store owner, on March 16, 1991. Soon Ja Du, 51, was found guilty of voluntary manslaughter, and sentenced to five years probation, 400 hours of community service, and a $500 fine. Well, until America’s next war in the Asia-Pacific region. I am sure it will be fought for glorious reasons. Even so, hypothetically, if I were a good boy and sat very still for the whole thing, I might be ok. But I don’t plan on it. This is where the 0.1% comes in. Non-Black people of color need to be conscious of the capacity to participate in anti-Blackness and how all non-Black bodies are positioned and permitted to benefit from participation in anti-Blackness. However, real solidarity cannot be created unilaterally, and the fact remains that Black people in this country have historically benefitted from and participated in anti-Asianness, anti-Arabness, Orientalism, Islamophobia and nativism in a manner similar to how Asian (in the most encompassing, continental sense of the word) people have benefitted from and participated in anti-Blackness. The project of empire began with the enslavement of Africans and the conquest of the Americas, and reached its zenith with the colonization of Asia. From the beginning, Asia was the goal of the imperial project. Columbus sailed west seeking India to increase his patrons’ profits from and control over the spice trade. The British, French, and Dutch Empires reached the height of their power with the conquest and plundering of Asia. America, too, first globally projected its power with the Spanish-American War, a conflict with fronts in Puerto Rico, Cuba, and the Philippines. Since 1898, US military power has established, defended, and maintained global hegemony through racialized military intervention in China, Japan, Laos, Samoa, Indonesia, Iran, Micronesia, the Sandwich Islands, the Philippines, Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, Afghanistan, Turkey, Yemen, Egypt, Libya, and Pakistan. Every time, these places were/are deemed “strategically important” enough for “American lives” to be sacrificed, but little to no information is ever recorded or given with any regularity on the number of local casualties. That is because these conflicts are not about locals, they are about American interests, morals, and way of life.

## Block

### Kritik

#### It's true and the best metric.

Chico et al 11 (A Primer on "Libidinal Economy" in Relation to Black Folks. Cosmic Hoboes: An Afropessimist Meditation (No)Space. <https://cosmichoboes.blogspot.com/2011/08/primer-on-libidinal-economy-in-relation.html>)

People who are interested in struggle need to understand the "libidinal economy." Coalition politicos like Al Sharpton like to tell us to put the unique experiences of black folks in the backseat to the interests of poor folks more generally. Such politicians expect us to submerge our interests as black people on the assumption that if poor people in general benefit from a political concession, poor black people will share equally in such benefits. Such politicos will continue to ignore the repeated evidence that a lot of nonblack people hate black people, even if doing so costs them money. If someone tells you that the problems black folks face are really just the problems that poor people face, they are telling you to ignore the libidinal economy. They are telling you that the political economy of capitalism is more important than the libidinal economy of antiblack racism. What is "libidinal economy"? In Red, White, and Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms (2010, Duke University Press), black political theorist Frank Wilderson highlights the distinction between political economy and libidinal economy (p. 9): Jared Sexton describes libidinal economy as “the economy, or distribution and arrangement, of desire and identification (their condensation and displacement), and the complex relationship between sexuality and the unconscious.” Needless to say, libidinal economy functions variously across scales and is as “objective” as political economy. Importantly, it is linked not only to forms of attraction, affection and alliance, but also to aggression, destruction, and the violence of lethal consumption. He emphasizes that it is “the whole structure of psychic and emotional life,” something more than, but inclusive of or traversed by, what Gramsci and other marxists call a “structure of feeling”; it is “a dispensation of energies, concerns, points of attention, anxieties, pleasures, appetites, revulsions, and phobias capable of both great mobility and tenacious fixation.” What does all this mean? Let's interpret this elaborate definition and get to how it thinks of "economy." When we think of economy, we usually think of something having to do with money. Wilderson uses the term political economy to refer to economy in the ways that we usually think of it: the ways people exchange materials and decide on how things are valued. Economy doesn't just mean the economy in the sense of the stock market or banks, but also any means of determining whether something is worth doing or possessing based on how much capital and labor power it yields. In struggle, we see over and over that money talks and bullshit walks. Economy has to do with what they value moves people to act. Economies are therefore very important to political action. But can there be an economy that exchanges something other than money or capital? Yes. To understand "economy" as Wilderson and Sexton use it, we have to think of economy in a more general way as things of all kinds that we can trade or save. You can accumulate not only cash or material items, but also fears and desires. Certain people accumulate more fear (the black athlete) and desire (the blonde cheerleader) than others. The term libidinal economy refers to the systems of exchange and valuation for fantasies, desires, fears, aversions, and enjoyment. Economy is about exchange and accumulation. Everyone feels fear and aggression, but where is it directed? The libidinal is about both people's desires, fantasies, and pleasures AND their phobias, fears, and violent consumptions. A libidinal economy has to do with which groups a subject is attracted to, which groups it is willing to form alliances with, and which people it is willing to provide affection to. Where can we see this libidinal economy? How can we illustrate this distinction? The libido is the collection of things like phobias and desires that are unconscious and invisible but that have a visible effect on the world, including the money economy. Some examples: We see libidinal economies at work any time there is a response by state that is out of all proportion to the material effects of any practice they are regulating. The USA incarcerates three million people, despite the fact that doing so has an adverse impact on US financial security. Hence the libidinal economy of the fear of black and brown people (who together comprise the overwhelming majority of inmates) trumps the political economy of the cost-benefit analysis of maintaining prisons. Let's take another example of the powder - versus crack-cocaine distinction, in which the same drug is punished differently at the federal level. Because the two drugs are chemically identical, there shouldn't be any distinction between how their use and sale is punished. In 2010, the law made it so that these two drugs were punished the same, although the Obama administration isn't in any hurry to make the abolition of this distinction retroactive so that the mostly black and brown people who are locked up because of it will get released. But the legal abolition of this distinction is not essential for us to look at. What is essential is why that distinction was made in the first place. Wilderson's work suggests that, for civil society, black people pose a threat that has nothing to do with the chemical content or the social and cultural effects of crack. Simply by being associated with black people, crack is seen as 100 times more threatening than is powder cocaine. The financial and social costs of locking all those black and brown people up and the financial and social costs of allowing all those white people to go free and continue to sell does not really matter to civil society. What the powder- versus crack-cocaine distinction shows is the desire to contain the threat that blackness symbolizes. This is the mark of libidinal economy. Cops, soldiers, firemen are considered sexually desirable because they become the heroes of civil society. The Oscar Grant shooting. Amadou Diallo was a victim of a extreme kind of violence because of the phobias that converged on his body. What is the exchange? Civil society has an anxiety about crime, and crime is always attached to black in urban areas. Police don't have to get a monetary award, but they get the gratitude of civil society. How does this play out in ways that don't have to do strictly with money? The desire for them may not show up in the amount of money they make. Cops get rewarded for their aggression. When the cop slammed dude into the glass at BART. Prison guards, thought of as having the toughest beat on the planet. They get rewarded for being the last line of defense against George Jackson. Oscar Grant was an accumulation of aggression and phobias. Why are the black people in Prince George's County, Maryland, segregated from white people in their same socioeconomic bracket with the same kinds of high-value real estate, and the same kinds of political-economic values? Living around white people has a value that cannot be explained in strictly monetary terms. AFDC benefited mostly white single mothers, and enjoyed a long history of support from 1936-the 1960s. It initially excluded black people. By the 1960s, when black people started getting it, attitudes changed toward it, making it seem like it was undeserved and a drain on national prosperity, and by 1984, when Ronald Reagan referred to "welfare queens in Cadillacs," it was clear that AFDC was "a black thing." In actual statistical terms, it was still used mostly by white women. But once it became associated with poor black women, it was seen as in need of drastic, radical reforms. But is this "libidinal economy" really that important? Frank Wilderson is using the distinction between a money economy and an economy of desire over and over again throughout this book. Wilderson talks about this by talking about the difference between word and deed. This is not the hypocrisy of the system. It IS the logic of the system. So Europeans tried to resolve the lack of labor power by passing laws that reduced homeless white people to the status of slaves. In the end, however, they never really enforced these laws. Wilderson quotes David Eltis, an economic historian, who says that the costs of settling the "new world" would have been significantly reduced if Europeans has simply enslaved other Europeans. But, Wilderson points out, "what Whites would have gained in economic value, they would have lost in symbolic value; and it is the [symbolic value] which structures the libidinal economy of civil society." In other words, the symbolic costs of Europeans enslaving other Europeans would have been too great. Instead, they went to Africa for their slaves, even though the financial cost of doing so was much, much greater. The radical left doesn't make this distinction. Cornel West and Tavis Smiley say they want to organize a new Poor People's Campaign, but they won't be able to explain why this is a failed project from the start. This is because they won't think about the aspects of coalition building that have nothing to do with money or the lack of money. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the so-called "Reagan Democrats" were poor and working-class white people, many of them in unions, who voted overwhelmingly for Reagan against their own economic interest. The white left mistakenly thinks about the Reagan Democrats as people who were duped. They view them as an example of what Marx called "false consciousness" and they see it as their duty to inform the white poor and working class of why they should vote left. But there were all kinds of signs that white poor and working-class folks simply hated black people and didn't want to live anywhere that there was a large community of black people, even if those black people are of the same or higher socioeconomic status. The Reagan Democrats were excited by Reagan's antiblack rhetoric of law and order, a rhetoric that was in response against the activities of the Black Liberation Army, Weather Underground, Black Panthers, and Black Guerilla Family. Marxists think a person is in a state of false consciousness if her political or social interests go another way than her material or financial interests. If you adopt this view, then you probably think that the Reagan Democrats just need to be educated correctly about what they have in common with the black poor and working class. You have to think that their hatred of black people is somehow "false" simply because it runs counter to their financial interests. But this would be to ignore their interest in maintaining white supremacy and antiblack racism. One of the things white men would lose would be access to black bodies for sexual pleasure and amusement. These examples are not just isolated cases of false consciousness, ignorance, media manipulation, or some mystical thing called "prejudice." They are all of those things, but they are also something much, much greater that any student of struggle needs to be aware of. These examples reveal the contours of an economy of desires that is not primarily concerned with money. It's not that the political economy isn't also antiblack. In fact, both economies are antiblack.

**Only our analysis of the libidinal economy can explain why even the most utopian political solutions reproduce antiblack metaphysics through the medium of desire – err neg because there’s a perverse investment in and bias toward concrete materialist analysis, which cannot escape antiblack modes of valuation – they can win the case, but it will never ensure Black sanctuary**

**Malaklou and Douglass 18** (M Shadee Malaklou, Assistant Professor of Critical Identity Studies at Beloit College, PhD in Culture and Theory from UC Irvine, Patrice Douglass, Assistant Professor of Gender, Sexuality, and Feminist Studies at Duke University, PhD in Culture and Theory from UC Irvine, July 2018, “Anti-Blackness in Debate: (Black)ness, Immigration, and Fugitivity,” coordinated through the Office of Student Activities and Leadership in the Department of Student Affairs at the University of Michigan, <https://rossmedia.bus.umich.edu/rossmedia/Play/2be904ba21e14173806a8f7f021c54281d?catalog=c6e843e215c44bd0ad401ab7cedaa6b821>, transcribed from video [2:19:18-2:22:30]) gz

M Shadee Malaklou: **I don’t think it has limitations**. You know, I love—Jared Sexton said once and Frank Wilderson quoted him at a talk in Omni Commons in Oakland, you know, that **“you’d better pay attention to white people’s fantasies because tomorrow they’ll be legislation.”** And so if we think about it like that, **the libidinal economy of antiblackness informs and overdetermines the political economy that we live in**.

Patrice Douglass: No, I completely agree. I think there’s such **a huge lean towards a** kind of **materialist analysis of the world**, like we look at the actual things in the world and rearrange them and make things better. And I think the libidinal economy helps us to **push a little bit further beyond just thinking of the rearrangements of capital** to say **if we were then to arrive at that endpoint that we so desire or we think we desire, would Black people still, in fact, be free?** **And they might not be free in our collective unconscious, in our imaginary**. And that’s where I think a theory of the libidinal economy is trying to push us to, to see that **even our most utopianist political sensibilities might in fact be tethered by antiblackness**. And we really have to push our ways of thinking that **it’s not just the material arrangements of the world** but **it’s also the subconscious** and **how we arrange our desires** and what we come to think about in terms of **what a just and pleasant world might be**. And for me, that was one of the biggest turning points in my own work, was realizing that sometimes **those cognitive schemas that we draw of what the world should look like on the other end are deeply riddled with those same problems**. And I’ll just give an example. Working in the anti-prison-industrial-complex movement, we always gave this narrative about, you know, what would life be like without prisons, and it was always healthy families, great schools, all of these things **without questioning what is the concept of family itself, what is the concept of school**, what are the kind of plantation and knowledge economies that we are foregrounding there? **Just the language itself cannot escape these very antiblack-centered ways of knowing oneself and one’s desire**. Like, **it even creeps up in our imagination of what a pleasant alternative to the violence that we experience now is**. In fact **it becomes another form of terror and violence for Black people**. It might not be that way for everyone. In fact, having pleasant families and great schools and all of these things might make some people safe from prisons, **but it doesn’t actually make Black people safe from captivity in other forms**, so we really have to push again to **challenge those very conventions that we hold true at every level, and thinking libidinally helps us to get to that point**.

**The black body is ignored by traditional economic rationality and indicators. FUNDAMENTALLY the economic system is premised for white wealth and black death- easy tie breaker in the growth good/bad debate.**

Simon ’17-[Blake. BA Political Science, minor in African American Studies UC Berkeley. “Black Buying Power is a Capitalistic Myth.” Medium.com. 1/23/17.]JL

The myth that Black America has a $1.3 trillion dollar buying power is a capitalistic lie that blames Black people’s spending habits for the reason why they are poor. This lie originates from Nielsen, which isa white owned consumer survey company which studies how much money Black people spend.

First and foremost, **there’s a huge difference between “buying power” and wealth**. The term “buying power” is a capitalistic term that refers to how much a community spends on consumer goods.Wealth on the other hand is ownership that is passed down from generation to generation. In addition,the term “power” implies that you have some form of control or ownership over the means of production. Which is false, as we do not control or own capitalism, white elites do.

**This idea that we can buy our way to freedom with Black buying power (Black capitalism) is false. We cannot use an economic system that positions Black people as slaves to free us**. Black capitalism requires a class group to be slaves just like white capitalism.

We must reject it, as it is inherently oppressive and does not work to our favor.

As a Black community, we do not and will never have wealth under capitalism. The system of racial capitalism will never allow us to catch up to the white elite by only consuming in our own community. Even if we buy Black 365 days a year, we will never obtain the same wealth as whites, as we do not own or control the means of production, whites do.

The facts are:

96.1 percent of the 1.2 million households in the top one percent by income were white.

America’s 100 richest people control more wealth than the entire Black population.

The 5 largest white landowners own more land than all Black people combined.

The average Black family would need 228 years to build the wealth of a white family today.

Despite these facts, unfortunately our own people have fallen victim to this capitalistic conservative lie.The Nation of Islam has its separation rooted in Black capitalism. The Nation’s philosophy is that if everyone in the Black community can give 35 cents a week, we could somehow buy our (or Indigenous peoples) land back. And often times we hear the minister saying that if Black people just piled their money together we would solve our issues and not face oppression. These sentiments are simply blaming Black people for being poor, and often times come out of leftist activst circles.

The fact of the matter is that racial capitalism is the problem. The root of the problem is NOT Black people having “bad spending habits”. But rather the system of white supremacist capitalism itself which positions Black people, specifically Black folks in the working class, as slaves to the white ruling elite.

To conclude, **American capitalism has its roots in genocide of indigenous peoples and the enslavement of Afrikans.** The wealth that this country was built on was at the expense of enslaved Afrikans building this country for the white elite. Capitalism will never free us. Black capitalism is deadly just like white capitalism. We must reject capitalism and resist it at all costs.

#### We straight turn McCarthy

Kelley, 15—Gary B. Nash Professor of American History at UCLA (Robin D.G., “Beyond Black Lives Matter,” Kalfou, Vol. 2, Iss. 2, (Fall 2015): 330-337, dml)

This implicit appeal to acknowledge us-to recognize our humanity, our dignity, and our right to live-is understandable in a world where the statesanctioned killing and caging of Black bodies is routine. But as George Lipsitz observed, such appeals are embedded in a humanist logic that emphasizes "interiority" and feeling, thereby elevating "the cultivation of sympathy over the creation of social justice."7 That is to say, our feelings of empathy in any representation of suffering are designed to be understood and individually felt rather than transformed into collective praxis. This is partly why concepts like reparations are so antithetical to modern liberalism. Given the trauma produced by an endless video loop of Black people dying at the hands of police officers who are almost never indicted, let alone prosecuted and convicted, collective healing and the cultivation of sympathy are to be expected. On one hand, this makes the movement's counterslogan, "All Lives Matter," all the more offensive and painful. "All Lives Matter" is heard and felt as a belittling or decentering of anti-Black racism. It trades on postracial myths of equivalency in suffering. On the other hand, sometimes we react to "All Lives Matter" with such hostility that it stands in as an unambiguous expression of anti-Black racism. Can we salvage these words? Don't we want to build a world in which every life is valuable, cherished, and sustained? Are we not seeking a world that recognizes multiple sites of dispossession and recognizes that state violence inside US borders is inseparable from US militarism around the world? The fact that we are compelled to a defensive position is a consequence of focusing on proving our value rather than critiquing the system that devalues all of us and destroys the world in the process.

The veracity of our humanity was never the issue-then or now. The problem lies with Western civilization's very construction of the human. As Sylvia Wynter, Cedric Robinson, Aimé Césaire and others have been saying for decades, the "Negro" was an invention, a fiction-like that of the Indian, the Oriental, the "Mexican," etc. Or in Frantz Fanon's oft-quoted line from The Wretched of the Earth: "It is the colonist who fabricated and continues to fabricate the colonized subject."8 Indeed, the entire structure of global white supremacy depends on such inventions, like the fictions of the Arab as non- or anti-Western and the "Immigrant" as essentially Latino/a, or the notion that indigenous people (in North America at least) are all dead. This is why we have such a hard time acknowledging that most so-called immigrants from Mexico and Central America are, in fact, indigenous.

The very foundations of Western civilization were built on such fabrications and enacted through violence. Once they crumble, so goes Western civilization's conceit as well as the massive philosophical smokescreen that enables (racial) capitalism-the greatest, most destructive, most violent crime wave in history-to masquerade as the engine of progress, a pure expression of freedom and liberty, the only path to human emancipation. The modern world that invented the Negro, the Oriental, the Indian, and the Savage as a means of inventing European Man was built on the theft of humans, theft of land and water, indiscriminate murder, violation of customary rights, moral economy, enclosure of the commons, destruction of the planet-outright lawlessness, justified by supposed rationality or what Weber might call instrumental rationality. To leave it at Black Lives Matter unintentionally conceals the crime. After all, these were the very processes that birthed the liberal humanism to which BLM activists seem to appeal.

In his book Forgeries of Memory and Meaning, Cedric Robinson further elaborates on the systems of racial maintenance and myth making, the "racial regimes" responsible for the inventions of the Negro (the Indian, the Oriental) and their relation to capital. What exactly are racial regimes? In Robinson's words, they "are constructed social systems in which race is proposed as a justification for the relations of power." The power is real and formidable but surprisingly unstable. For Robinson, "the covering conceit of a racial regime is a makeshift patchwork masquerading as memory and the immutable. Nevertheless, racial regimes do possess history, that is, discernible origins and mechanisms of assembly. But racial regimes are unrelentingly hostile to their exhibition."9 In other words, to say that anti-Blackness is foundational to Western civilization is not to say that it is fixed or permanent. On the contrary, it is incredibly fragile and must be constantly remade; it is epiphenomenal to the production of Blackness-which is an essential component of modern racial regimes, but not its totality. In the last century alone, racial regimes have been remade, reconfigured, destabilized, and consolidated many times, employing new technologies to circulate old racial fabulations and new fictions in the process of capitalist expansion.

Proving one's humanity will not uproot racial regimes, for the very evidence of our humanity is their raison d'etre. Our exploitation is evidence of our value, but it requires enormous intellectual, juridical, and psychic resources to conceal our humanity. Slavery was not just social death, but was based on a cost-benefit analysis that assumed the disposability of Black lives. The system of extracting surplus emerged within a logic of racial hierarchy and racial subjugation that dragged Africans, Asians, and Europeans proletarianized by enclosure to the lands of the Americas, Oceania, parts of South Asia and Africa, and the Eastern Mediterranean-where indigenous people were dispossessed, enslaved, or exploited by other means. Enclosure is yet another example of theft and violence masking as "law, order, security": backed by the rule of law, the state employs violence to discipline, to reclassify, to criminalize, and to destroy sovereignty and create disorder. Enclosure is part of this process of war-a war on the commons, which ultimately turns some of the expropriated people into a proletariat (including European industrial, maritime, and landless rural labor, as well as prostitutes and beggars), turns a portion into settlers, and sends a portion to the workhouse. Some are merely casualties whose flesh mingles with the earth and whose bodies-sometimes hanging from a tree or broken on the wheel-serve to terrorize those who resist the new discipline.10

While the value of Black labor may have ebbed and flowed with the changing character of the global economy, there has never been a moment in US history when our humanity mattered, when Black people could enjoy full privileges and protections of citizenship. But the same can be said of most of the planet-at least until the mid-twentieth century, although I would venture to say this is still the case. What Black resistance calls into question is the inhumanity of the system, the inhumanity of those who subjugate in the name of civilization; it insists that the survival of humanity (and this is not the humanity defined by the Enlightenment) depends on the complete destruction of racial capitalism, patriarchy, and regimes of normativity.

As I wrote in the aftermath of the George Zimmerman verdict, unless we come to terms with this history, we will continue to believe that the system just needs to be tweaked, or the right-wing fringe defeated, or our humanity acknowledged.11 We will miss the routine character of state violence; its origins in the very formation of colonialism, slavery, and capitalism; and the ways in which routine violence has become a central component of US policies, including drone warfare and targeted killing. We cannot change the situation simply by finding the right legal strategy, the best policies, or recognition.

### Case

#### These investments into the systems of racial capitalism culminate in constant war, interventions, and the super exploitation of blackness in the name of profit.

**Burden-Stelly 20** [Charisse Burden-Stelly, Assistant Professor of Africana Studies and Political Science At Carelton University, July 1, 2020, “Modern U.S. Racial Capitalism”, EBSCOhost, Pages 8-10, JMH]

Drawing on the intellectual production of twentieth-century Black anticapitalists**, I theorize modern U.S. racial capitalism as a racially hierarchical political economy constituting war and militarism, imperialist accumulation, expropriation by domination, and labor superexploitation.14** The racial here specifically refers to Blackness, defined as African descendants’ relationship to the capitalist mode of production—their structural location—and the condition, status, and material realities emanating therefrom.15 It is out of this structural location that the irresolvable contradiction of value minus worth arises. Stated differently, Blackness is a capacious category of surplus value extraction essential to an array of political-economic functions, including accumulation, disaccumulation, debt, planned obsolescence, and absorption of the burdens of economic crises.16 At the same time**, Blackness is the quintessential condition of disposability, expendability, and devalorization.** My operationalization of capitalism follows Oliver Cromwell Cox’s explication in Capitalism and American Leadership. 17 Modern U.S. racial capitalism arose in the context of the First World War, when, as Cox explains, the United States took advantage of the conflict to capture the markets of South America, Asia, and Africa for its “over-expanded capacity.”18 Cox further expounds upon this auspicious moment of ascendant modern U.S. racial capitalism thus: By 1914, the United States had brought its superb natural resources within reach of intensive exploitation. Under the stimulus of its foreign-trade outlets, the financial assistance of the older capitalist nations, and a flexible system of protective tariffs, the nation developed a magnificent work of transportation and communication so that its mines, factories, and farms became integrated into an effectively producing organism having easy access to its seaports.… [Likewise,] further internal expansion depended upon far greater emphasis on an ever widening foreign commerce.… Major entrepreneurs of the United States proceeded to step up their campaign for expansion abroad. The war accentuated this movement. It accelerated the growth of [modern] American [racial] capitalism and impressed upon its leaders as nothing had before the need for external markets.19 Relatedly, Peter James Hudson argues that the First World War fundamentally changed the terms of order of international finance, allowing New York to compete with London, Paris, and Berlin for the first time in the realm of global banking. This was not least because the Great War “drastically reordered global credit flows,” with the United States transforming from a debtor into a creditor nation.20 In addition to Latin American and Caribbean nations and businesses turning to the United States for financing and credit, domestic saving and investment patterns were altered to the benefit of imperial financial institutions like the City Bank.21 Although the United States is, to use Cox’s terminology, more a “lusty child of an already highly developed capitalism” than an exceptional capitalist power, the nation perfected its techniques of accumulation through its vast natural wealth, large domestic market, imbalance of Northern and Southern economies, and, importantly, through its lack of concern for the political and economic welfare of the overwhelming masses of its population, least of all the descendants of the enslaved.22 **Modern U.S. racial capitalism is thus sustained by military expenditure, the maintenance of an extremely low standard of living in “dependent” countries, and the domestic superexploitation of Black toilers and laborers**. Cox notes that Black labor has been the “chief human factor” in wealth production; as such, “the dominant economic class has always been at the motivating center of the spreads of racial antagonism. This is to be expected since the economic content of the antagonism, especially at its proliferating source in the South, has been precisely that of labor-capital relations.”23 In a general sense, **racial capitalism in the United States constitutes “a peculiar variant of capitalist production” in which Blackness expresses a structural location at the bottom of the labor hierarchy characterized by depressed wages, working conditions, job opportunities, and widespread exclusion from labor unions.24** Furthermore, modern U.S. racial capitalism is rooted in the imbrication of anti-Blackness and antiradicalism. Anti-Blackness describes the reduction of Blackness to a category of abjection and subjection through narrations of absolute biological or cultural difference; ruling-class monopolization of political power; negative and derogatory mass media propaganda; the ascent of discriminatory legislation that maintains and reinscribes inequality, not least various modes of segregation; and social relations in which distrust and antipathy toward those racialized as Black is normalized and in which “interracial mass behavior involving violence assumes a continuously potential danger.”25 Anti-Blackness thus conceals the inherent contradiction of Blackness—value minus worth—obscuring and distorting its structural location by, as Ralph and Singhal remark, contorting it into only a “debilitated condition.”26 **Antiradicalism can be understood as the physical and discursive repression and condemnation of anticapitalist and/or left-leaning ideas, politics, practices, and modes of organizing that are construed as subversive, seditious, and otherwise threatening to capitalist socie**ty. These include, but are not limited to, internationalism, anti-imperialism, anticolonialism, peace activism, and antisexism. Anti-Blackness and antiradicalism function as the legitimating architecture of modern U.S. racial capitalism, which includes rationalizing discourses, cultural narratives, technologies of repression, legal structures, and social practices that inform and are informed by racial capitalism’s political economy.27 Throughout the twentieth century, anti-Blackness propelled the “Black Scare,” defined as the specter of racial, social, and economic domination of superior whites by inferior Black populations. Antiradicalism, in turn, was enunciated through the “Red Scare,” understood as the threat of communist takeover, infiltration, and disruption of the American way of life.28 For example, in the 1919 Justice Department Report, Radicalism and Sedition Among the Negroes, As Reflected in Their Publications, it was asserted that the radical antigovernment stance of a certain class of Negroes was manifested in their “ill-governed reaction toward race rioting,” “threat of retaliatory measures in connection with lynching,” open demand for social equality, identification with the International Workers of the World (IWW), and “outspoken advocacy of the Bolshevik or Soviet doctrine.”2 Here, **anti-Blackness, articulated through the fear of the “assertion of race consciousness,”** was attached to the IWW and Bolshevism—in other words, to anticapitalism—to make it appear even more subversive and dangerous. Likewise, antiradicalism, expressed through the denigration of the IWW and Soviet Doctrine, was made to seem all the more threatening and antithetical to the social order in **its linkage with Black insistence on equality and self-defense against racial terrorism.** In this way, “defiance and insolently race-centered condemnation of the white race” and “the Negro seeing red” came to be understood as seditious in the context of modern U.S. racial capitalism. The link between my theory of modern U.S. racial capitalism and Robinson’s catholic theory of racial capitalism, beyond his “suggest[ion] that it was there,” is vivified through the prison abolitionist and scholar Ruth Wilson Gilmore, who writes: “Capitalism…[is] never not racial.… Racial capitalism: a mode of production developed in agriculture, improved by enclosure in the Old World, and captive land and labor in the Americas, perfected in slavery’s time-motion, field factory choreography, its imperative forged on the anvils of imperial war-making monarchs.”**30 Racial capitalism, she continues, “requires all kinds of scheming, including hard work by elites and their compradors in the overlapping and interlocking space-economies of the planet’s surface. They build and dismantle and reconfigure states, moving capacity into and out of the public realm.** And they think very hard about money on the move.”31 Perhaps more than Gilmore, though, my approach aligns with that of Neville Alexander as described by Hudson.32 Like Alexander, who focused on South Africa, I offer a particularistic understanding of racial capitalism, mine being rooted in the political economy of Blackness and the legitimating architectures of anti-Blackness and antiradicalism in the United States. Gilmore qua Robinson offers a more universalist and transhistorical conception. Like Alexander, my theory of modern U.S. racial capitalism is primarily rooted in (Black) Marxist-Leninists and fellow travelers. This is an important epistemological distinction: whereas Robinson finds Marxism-Leninism to be, at best, inattentive to race, my theory of modern U.S. racial capitalism is rooted in the work of Black freedom fighters who, as Marxist-Leninists, were able to offer potent and enduring analyses and critiques of the conjunctural entanglements of racialism, white supremacy, and anti-Blackness, on the one hand, and capitalist exploitation and class antagonism on the other hand.33

#### The aff’s use of statistics to measure Black life and death fortifies structural antiblackness—it pays lip service to liberation while rendering Blackness legible and quantifiable, and void of intrinsic value

Martina 16 (Egbert Alejandro Martina, Rotterdam-based scholar-activist and cultural critic, co-founder of Mediacate, a media literacy organization, which hosts workshops, and a monthly reading group at the Cultural Embassy in Amsterdam, founding member of ERIF, a foundation that conducts critical research of media expressions, and provides anti-racist education for a broader audience, *Playing the Numbers Game*, May 2016 https://processedlives.wordpress.com/2016/05/14/playing-the-numbers-game/)

Last year, the Notification Centre for Online Discrimination received 652 complaints of online discrimination—an increase of 50%. The year before, the centre received 305 complaints. What does a ‘rise’ in online racist incidents mean? And for whose benefit are these figures being produced? What does it mean to monitor the ‘flow’ and ‘fluctuations’ in racist incidents? What kind of work does ‘measuring racism’ do? What does it mean to think of racism as something that is measurable, quantifiable? And do these numbers tell us anything about the workings of racialisation? The act of measuring reduces racism to something other than what it is. We must interrogate the kind of work that measurements, degrees of comparison, and comparative superlatives (as in “racism is becoming much worse,” or “things are getting worse and worse”) do. In order to get an understanding of what facts and statistics do rather than say, we have to situate the production of facts and statistics in a wider context of knowledge production in Dutch academia. In their essay Designs and (Co)Incidents, Philomena Essed and Kwame Nimako note that Dutch minority research “mostly (but not always) problematiz[es] ethnic minorities while generally downplaying the influence of racism, the ramifications of the colonial history, and concomitant presuppositions of European (Dutch) civil and cultural superiority.” The Dutch minority research machinery spits out reports and statistics, that shape policies. These reports are the product of enumerative practices, that concern themselves with how many?, rather than analytic practices which ask why? Essed and Nimako tell us that why is rarely asked. Instead, “[r]esearch is largely about ethnic minorities […] about their migration and their degree (or lack) of economic, social and political integration in the Netherlands.” Research on people of colour builds on a White Dutch infrastructure “where policy, party politics, and research intertwine.” In a context in which the concept of institutional racism is still treated as a myth and the experiences of Black people are discredited or downplayed, the statistics generated by the Notification Centre for Online Discrimination provide Black people with a reasonable and ‘objective’ basis to argue the reality of anti-black racism. Measuring ‘racist incidents’ is a way to translate the violence of racism into workable terms. However, this demand for a workable formula and unequivocal proof trains our eyes to focus “much more on taxonomy than politics.” A failure or refusal to provide incontestable proof—in the form of recognizable acts of commonly held assumptions about what is racist—will lead to instances where if you cannot, or will not, provide factual evidence (someone said, or did, something racist), then what took place mustn’t have been racist, at all. The result is that fewer credible victims is taken to mean fewer culpable perpetrators. As such, anti-Black racism is considered real and intelligible only insofar as it is contingent and visible, measurable and detectable. Racial violence, however, “is not about objective measurable physical and social characteristics.” Tabulating violent acts and violations scales down and reduces racial violence to a quantifiable variable, and presents it as temporally closed off—rather than a logic that positions populations differently in relation to (economic) resources. At this point, it should be indisputable that there are inequalities in the Dutch political, educational, judicial and legal systems, and in the housing and labour market. Countless state reports with facts and statistics about racial inequality have been produced, and yet Black people are still expected to ‘prove’ the reality of structural racism. We suffocate under the weight of evidence. And the expectation that we attend, underneath that burden, to the White demand for detectable and ‘unambiguous’ proof, in the face of racial violence that is gratuitous and structural, is perverse. Even when the evidence presented is unambiguous (when something recognizably racist has taken place), it is still made subject to argument. The persistent White demand for more ‘proof’ raises a number of concerns when read alongside the Black demand for freedom. What are the dynamics of this alongside? If the identification of racism and racial hurt depend not only on recognizable acts, but also on the presence of a pained Black body, then the identification of racism puts a strain on the Black interior—“that is black life and creativity behind the public face of stereotype and limited imagination.” Speaking on her experiences with White feminists, Doreen Hazel, a Black Dutch womanist theologian, expressed her anger at the expectation that “black women should constantly display the pain of racism.” The White demand for ‘proof’ is a demand for Black people to make their pain, their most intimate feelings, and thoughts available to Whiteness. More ‘proof’ speaks of a certain desire for Black people to make anti-Black racism ‘accessible’, so ‘unknowing’ Whites might ‘know what it’s like’. Blackness, then, becomes legible through trauma, taxonomies, facts, and statistics—Blackness constitutes a body of evidence. Thus, within this dynamic, “observation and taxonomies of facts and statistics take precedence over introspection, musing, and reflection.” Katherine McKittrick tells us in Mathematics Black Life that “blackness arrives through the ordinary, proved, former, certified, nearly worn-out archives of ledgers, accounts, price tags, and descriptors of economic worth and financial probability.” Black life is often still written into the political landscape by way of calculations. To think of Black people is “to think of statistics, slums, rapes, injustices, remote violence.” And these ‘truths’ about Black people are circulated by mainstream media without offering a broader analysis of what the use and proliferation of such ‘facts’ and figures bring into being. The use of numbers and statistics, that are generated by state apparatuses, to make Black life and death legible only as accumulation abstracted from White supremacy and anti-Blackness pose a problem for “the calculation of black humanity.” It relies on the quantification of Blackness as pathology—by which I mean the data gathering practices of the state and the police (practices that are passed off as ‘objective’) that lend more weight to the violence that both founds and preserves Blackness as pathology. What numbers and figures often mystify is how anti-Black social interests determine what is researched, what kind of data is gathered, which pieces of information describe the issues, or are served as factual evidence. The Central Bureau of Statistics issued a report stating that Antillean and Aruban men in the Netherlands are thirteen times more likely to be the victim of murder than White Dutch men. Why was this specific numerical data about “the condition of Antillean and Aruban men” generated? What does this kind of information do—apart from seemingly confirm the ‘truth’ that Antilleans are more violent? Glenn Helberg, chairman of a consultation body representing Dutch Caribbeans, (OCaN) argued that the many murders among the Antillean and Aruban Dutch are directly related to drug trafficking and the demand for drugs in the Netherlands. Helberg admitted that over all these years he still does not know what the CBS research on Dutch Caribbeans proves, or “what these numbers say.” Facts and figures become the only ways that we might come to know Black people. What do we lose when our experiences are only known, or intelligible, through statistics—when measurement is the predominant way to understand Black life? I want to return to the question of what state reports that lay bare racial inequality do. State reports, statistics, ciphers, figures, records, and accounts in themselves do not produce ‘truth’ about, nor do they give us complete insight into, the lived realities of structural racism—the destabilizing effects of stress, anxiety, disappointment, depression. How many reports does it take for the realities of structural racism to register? State reports that document racial inequality are part of minority research industry. These reports, perhaps unintentionally, fortify a political system that necessitates racial inequality while giving the impression that something is being done—that is (more) numbers and facts are being generated. In spite of a mountain of reports, the Dutch government is still to take any substantial action against structural racism. In fact, Prime Minister Mark Rutte suggested in an interview that the ball is in our court: he urges us to ‘fight our way in’. Rutte states that, “One of the things I have learned is how impactful discrimination is. It still occurs frequently in the Netherlands and it really matters whether your name is Jan or Mohammed when you are applying for a job. I have thought about that and came to the conclusion that I can’t fix this. The paradox is that the solution lies with Mohammed. I can say to the Netherlands: ‘Please do not discriminate, judge someone on their character and knowledge’. But if it does happen, Muhammad has a choice: give up due to an insult, or continue. Newcomers have always had to adapt and they have always had to deal with prejudice and discrimination. You should fight your way in.” Rutte’s solution to racial oppression is telling: in order to ‘move beyond’ racism, people of colour simply need to adjust their attitude and outlook! Here, Rutte follows the popular understanding that the resolution of racism requires (from those who face racism) hard work, an attitude adjustment, and the drive to develop resilience capacities. Not only does he push responsibility away from his government (which designs and implements racist policies) and civil society (which serves as a factotum of the state), but he also places the onus of ‘progress’ squarely, though dolefully, on racially marginalized people. His statement makes racial inequality, which he equates with ‘being insulted’, appear, due to an a-historical understanding of ‘prejudice’ and ‘discrimination’, unfortunate. Black people are expected to fight our way into “a social world that, in effect, takes no responsibility for the options available.” Even though racism is increasingly discussed in terms of its structural and material features generally, it is still predominantly understood as an ‘individual case’ specifically. Racism isn’t recognized as a material structure of the Enlightenment, modernity, capitalism, and democracy. Rather, racism is imagined as an ‘inherently human flaw’, a tangible thing locatable ‘out there’, that surfaces unexpectedly and unintentionally in, for example, policies and the dispositions/behaviours of ‘other people’—it is rarely understood as “a political project that emerged under specific conditions within the context of the European nation-state” and shapes the intimate politics of everyday interactions. “White supremacy is,” as Joseph Pugliese writes, “a priori the exercise of violence through the diffuse iteration of everyday practices.” Thus, whether a White person wants “an unequal distribution of money, power, rights and privileges,” or not, is beside the point—if we take White supremacy, of which racism is a synecdoche, to be a political system, then the question whether a White person wants an unequal distribution of resources is irrelevant. And yet, there is a need to find a point of origin for anti-Black racism on which claims of racial hurt can be grounded—as though, anti-Black violence is contingent. In the search for points of origin, anti-Black violence is reduced to a measurable and quantifiable variable that seemingly operates independent of structures. If we take anti-Blackness to be constitutive of the category Human, western democracy, and its idea of freedom and justice, then the conundrum that Black people face might read as what does it mean, as a Black person, to ‘overcome’ racial barriers, or ‘fight your way into’ an anti-Black world? Or, to put it differently, what does it mean to desire, as a Black person, a place in a world that positions you “in certain ways structurally, constitutively, at odds with modern notions of the human”? This paradox is paradigmatic of the position of the Dutch Caribbean in European Netherlands who, while enjoying the rights of full citizenship is also positioned as yet another of the many unwanted immigrants in the Dutch ‘immigration problem’.

#### Christopher Darby & Sarah Sewall 21 evidence

China has evolved from a country that largely steals and imitates technology to one that now also improves and even pioneers it

China’s hunger for data extends to some of the most personal information imaginable: our own DNA

#### Their ev concludes antitrust alone fails to create competitive markets---should make you skeptical of solvency and proves the turns are true

Marshall Steinbaum & Maurice E. Stucke 19. Assistant Professor of Economics, University of Utah. Douglas A. Blaze Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law. “The Effective Competition Standard: A New Standard for Antitrust.” <https://marshallsteinbaum.org/assets/steinbaum-and-stucke-2020-effective-competition-standard-uchicago-law-review-.pdf>.

America, as legal and economic scholars are increasingly noting, has a market power problem. The emerging evidence points to less competition, higher markups, greater concentration, and widening wealth and income inequality. The current state of competition law benefits the select few—at the expense of nearly everyone else.

Our antitrust laws are supposed to deal with concentrated economic power. The problem is that the laws have been hijacked in two ways. First, ideologues narrowed the substance of antitrust from addressing a variety of goals to focusing solely on the concept of consumer welfare—namely, that harm to competition within the legal meaning of the antitrust laws consists solely of harm to consumers and their welfare, as measured almost exclusively by price and quantity effects in output markets. Second, some courts and enforcers went even further, declining to find antitrust liability in conduct that harms consumers on the theory that it carries other benefits, like long-run economic growth. Recent US Supreme Court decisions, including Ohio v American Express Co, and the US District Court’s decision to allow the AT&T/Time Warner merger illustrate how antitrust, under the prevailing consumer welfare standard, has been weakened and distorted beyond all recognition. Courts have elevated the burden of proof on the government and other antitrust plaintiffs to such an extent that the Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts have become unenforceable for many anticompetitive practices, other than cartels.

If the United States continues with a light-if-any-touch antitrust review of mergers and turns a blind eye to abuses by dominant firms, concentration and crony capitalism will likely increase, competition and our well-being will decrease further, and power and profits will continue to fall into fewer hands. Startups, small and midsize firms, and Americans more broadly—as workers, consumers, and democratic citizens—will be left to the beneficence or spite of a few powerful, but arbitrary, corporations.

This trend is reversible if we restore antitrust as a guarantor of effective competition. To tackle today’s market power problem, we offer an effective competition antitrust standard to replace the prevailing consumer welfare standard, which courts and scholars have interpreted differently (and at times inconsistently). The effective competition standard restores the primary aim of the antitrust laws—namely, the dispersion and deconcentration of significant private power wherever in the economy it is to be found, including throughout supply chains and in the labor market.

Antitrust does not operate at the margins. In reality, antitrust has been enormously important for structuring the economy now and in the past, either in favor of concentrating economic power or against it. Although this Essay articulates antitrust policies aimed at deconcentrating power, we recognize that antitrust alone cannot accomplish this urgent objective. Progressive taxation, labor reforms, effective (not captured) sector-specific regulation, corporate governance, and social welfare policies are only some of the other policy tools necessary. Thus, while strong antitrust enforcement is often an important condition for preserving a competitive market structure, policymakers should not confine themselves to that tool.

#### No COVID brink now---fed is nowhere near changing interest rates

Cox 7/28 – Jeff Cox, CNBC; 2021(“Fed holds rates near zero, says economy has gotten better even with pandemic worries,” CNBC, <https://www.cnbc.com/2021/07/28/fed-decision-july-2021.html>, bam)

The Federal Reserve on Wednesday held its benchmark interest rate near zero and said the economy continues to progress despite concerns over the pandemic spread.

As expected, the Federal Open Market Committee concluded its two-day meeting by keeping interest rates in a target range between zero and 0.25%.

Along with that, the committee said in a unanimously approved statement that the economy continues to “strengthen.”

Despite the optimism about the economy, Chairman Jerome Powell said the Fed is nowhere near considering a rate hike.

“Our approach here has been to be as transparent as we can. We have not reached substantial further progress yet,” he said. “We see ourselves having some ground to cover to get there.”

“Substantial further progress” on inflation and employment is the benchmark the Fed has set before it will tighten policy, which would mean slowing and ultimately stopping monthly bond purchases and ultimately raising interest rates.. The statement noted only that “progress” has been made, and the FOMC will continue to watch conditions to see how close they get to the Fed’s goals.

#### They can’t solve 5g leadership---it requires a shift toward dynamic, not effective, competition---zeros the advantage

David J. Teece 18. Thomas W. Tusher professor in global business at the University of California, Berkeley’s Haas School of Business. He is also the director of the Tusher Initiative on Intellectual Capital Management in the school’s Institute for Business Innovation and the founder of Berkeley Research Group, a consulting firm. “Antitrust laws must promote the true driver of growth: innovation.” <https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/409762-antitrust-laws-must-promote-the-true-driver-of-growth-innovation>.

The goal underpinning U.S. antitrust law is to promote competition that leads to lower prices and enhanced consumer welfare.

For years, antitrust agencies have approached this goal by focusing on short-term, static competition, which emphasizes achieving low prices in the here and now.

This narrow focus, however, has resulted in unnecessary conflict between the static competitive analysis deployed by antitrust regulators and the dynamic issues raised by intellectual property.

Fortunately, over the last few decades, a growing recognition has emerged among economists that antitrust laws must be recalibrated to preserve the incentive to innovate and promote the U.S. innovation economy.

These economists are calling for an antitrust framework that prioritizes dynamic over static competition — placing less weight on market concentration in the assessment of market power and more weight on assessing technological opportunity, innovation-driven competition and appropriate enterprise-level capabilities.

At the heart of this movement is the foundational principle, dating back to Joseph Schumpeter and Nobel Laureate economist Robert Solow, that innovation is the main driver of economic growth.

Indeed, given the strong economic evidence that innovation drives productivity, sharpens competition and creates new products, a serious consumer-oriented antitrust policy, with an intermediate-to-long-term orientation, necessarily must focus primarily on supporting and advancing innovation.

However, although antitrust agencies routinely claim to favor both innovation and competition, this has not always been the case.

For instance, during the previous administration, some agency heads unnecessarily generated tension between static competitive analysis — with its undue emphasis on achieving low prices in the short term — and the dynamic issues implicated by intellectual property and associated royalty payments.

Royalties, in the short run, raise prices of licensed goods relative to the prices that would prevail absent payments.

However, payments to licensors also support innovation by helping innovators achieve the economic returns necessary to draw forth the critical investment dollars needed to support research and development (R&D) and continuing innovation.

This model produces a continuous cycle of innovation in which innovators are properly incentivized to invent and reinvest their royalties into more R&D, which leads to new innovations and restarts the cycle.

A prime example of the dynamic benefits flowing from such an innovation ecosystem is 5G. This revolutionary technology promises the ability to connect to and control cities, automobiles, objects and devices, transforming a broad range of industries in the process.

Thanks to its private-sector top performers, the United States currently leads the world in 5G — a distinction that comes with an extraordinary opportunity for massive economic growth and increased consumer welfare.

However, the rigid application of an antitrust framework focused on short-term pricing, rather than on innovation as a critical driver of competition, could cause the United States to forfeit its 5G leadership position.

This would not only reduce consumer welfare but would pose a clear risk to U.S. national security — a fact recognized by U.S. national defense agencies in prohibiting a foreign company from acquiring Qualcomm, a U.S. technology company, because the proposed transaction imperiled Qualcomm’s 5G leadership position.

Recently, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has indicated that a course correction may be underway. In a series of speeches, Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim, head of the DOJ’s Antitrust Division, signaled that the focus of a sound antitrust analysis must be less on short-term pricing and more on the innovation and growth that delivers value to consumers over the longer term.

For example, in his speech before the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, Delrahim invoked “promoting dynamic competition” as a normative goal of competition regulators.

He also declared that “competition law enforcers around the world must give careful consideration to the interests that drive innovation, including by allowing innovators to reap the full rewards of their investment in research and development.” It appears that Delrahim correctly recognizes that innovation is the critical driver of competition.

While Delrahim’s leadership on this issue is admirable, officials at the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) regrettably have yet to follow the DOJ’s lead. The FTC continues to endorse outdated modes of competition regulation and policies that are not properly calibrated to promote dynamic competition and advance innovation.

In order to truly enhance consumer welfare over the long term, I hope the FTC soon will join hands with the DOJ and help move the United States toward a pro-innovation policy founded upon a dynamic competition paradigm.

For over 30 years, a small group of economists has been calling for a pivot in antitrust in favor of dynamic over static competition. With Delrahim at the helm of the DOJ’s Antitrust Division, we may soon witness such a pivot.

U.S. antitrust policy needs to adopt a deeper understanding of innovation processes and competition over the long run, and there needs to be greater policy coherence among antitrust, industrial and technology policies.

The dynamic competition paradigm is both the easiest and the best intellectual paradigm for the competition agencies and the courts to employ to free antitrust from its current outmoded framework. Indeed, prioritizing dynamic competition over its weaker sibling will enhance not just consumer welfare, but economic welfare, too.